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Making
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Health
Regulations Work: Lessons from
the
2014
Ebola
Outbreak
Tsung-Ling Lee*
ABSTRACT
Many legal scholars believe that the lack of enforcement
mechanisms provided by the International Health Regulations
(IHR) in part explains the slow containment of the deadly Ebola
virus disease outbreak in West Africa in 2014. In contrast, some
global health practitioners deem funding for global health
emergencies as a key remedy to the ineffective international
infectious disease control regime. Such belief underpinned the
creation of the Pandemic Emergency Facility (PEF), the World
Bank's new financinginitiative, aiming to financeglobal disaster
response. Some commentators hope that the establishment of the
PEF will resuscitate international interest in global health
security and cooperation. Although current discussion touches
upon how to integrate the PEF with the existing international
infectious disease control regime, much remains unclear about
how the PEF will relate to the IHR operationally and
normatively. Relatedly, legal scholars and global health
practitionerscontinue to talk about IHR enforcement and global
health emergency funding as two different things, without
exploring how the latter can incentivize the former.
Starting from the IHR as a pillar of global health security,
this Article focuses on strengthening the IHR enforcement
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mechanism-thus far overlooked in the current discussion-visa-vis the PEF.It also argues that such linkage is important in
ensuring consistent, rapid global health emergency responses.
Drawing on lessons from the 2014 Ebola outbreak, the Article
demonstrates that the proposal is normatively desirable and
politically feasible. The Article makes a timely intervention, as
the PEF has tremendous potential in shaping the international
infectious disease regime, creating new opportunitiesand anxiety
simultaneously.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Many legal scholars believe international law is a pillar of the
maintenance of global health security and cooperation. This belief is
reflected in the extensive law-making power granted to the World
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Health Organization (WHO),1 a global public health agency. Yet, in the
past decades, and most recently during the Ebola virus disease
(sometimes abbreviated "EVD," but referred to here more colloquially
as "Ebola") outbreak of 2014 in West Africa, the consistently poor
performance of the WHO in the global policy realm of infectious disease
control shattered that expectation markedly. Indeed, at the most
recent opening of the annual World Health Assembly (WHA), German
Chancellor Angela Merkel made clear that the WHO's response to the
2014 Ebola epidemic was nothing less than catastrophic. 2 Chancellor
Merkel's sharp criticism reflects a widely held sentiment within the
international community because the delayed WHO response to the
epidemic had resulted in 11,300 deaths and 28,601 confirmed cases, as
of December 1, 2015. 3 Many infectious disease experts believe that,
had the WHO responded promptly, such human devastation could have
been averted. 4 Likewise, many commentators noted that the
International Health Regulations (IHR), 5 which provide the

1.
Szeming Sze, WHO: From Small Beginnings, 9 WORLD HEALTH FORUM, 29 2934 (1988), http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/46414/lfWHF_1988 9 1lp29-34.pdf
(last visited Sept. 18, 2016) [https://perma.cc/KT6J-8FZM] (archived Sept. 18, 2016).
2.
Kirsten Grieshaber, German ChancellorMerkel Tells WHO Global Catastrophe
Plan Needed for
Epidemic Outbreaks, US
NEWS
(May
18,
2015),
http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2015/05/18/merkel-global-catastropheplan-needed-after-ebola-crisis [https:I/perma.cc/9EEV-KUSE] (archived Sept. 18, 2016);
see also Sarah Boseley, Planto Reform WHO After Ebola to be Unveiled by Angela Merkel,
GUARDIAN (May 18, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/18/
angela-merkel-plan -restructure -world-health-organisation [https://perma.cc/AC73SFK6] (archived Sept. 18, 2016); Chancellor Angela Merkel, Statement at the 68th
Session of the WHO World Health Assembly in Geneva (May 18, 2015)
(http://www.who.int/mediacentre/events/2015/wha68/speeches/en/ [https://perma.cc/
4PZF-524N] (archived Sept. 18, 2016)).
3.
Ebola Data and Statistics, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (WHO), http://apps.who.intl
gho/data/view.ebola-sitrep.ebola-summary-latest?lang=en (last visited Sept. 17, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/MW35-4VNH] (archived Sept. 18, 2016) (totaling cases from Guinea,
Liberi,a and Sierra Leone).
4.
See WHO Leadership Statement on the Ebola Response and WHO Reforms,
WHO (Apr. 16, 2015), http://www.who.int/csr/disease/ebola/joint-statement-ebola/enl
[https://perma.cc/BQ5Z-LJAM] (archived Sept. 18, 2016); Denise Roland, Experts
Criticize World Health Organisation's'Slow'Ebola Outbreak Response, WALL ST. J. (May
12,
2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/experts-criticize-world-health-organizationsslow-ebola-outbreak-response-1431344306 (subscription required)
[https://perma.cc/2T6R-7Z3W] (archived Sept. 18, 2016).
5.
See, e.g., Lawrence 0 Gostin, Mary DeBartolo, & Eric Friedman, The
InternationalHealth Regulations 10 Years On: The Governing Framework for Global
Health Security, 386 THE LANCET 2222, 2222-26 (2015); Suerie Moon et al., Will Ebola
Change the Game? Ten Essential Reforms Before the Next Pandemic. The Report of the
Harvard-LSHTMIndependent Panel on the Global Response to Ebola, 386 THE LANCET
2204, 2204-21 (2015). Partly in response to the agency's widely criticized failure in the
2014 Ebola outbreak, the WHO has taken a more proactive action in declaring the recent
cluster of microcephaly and neurological abnormalities found in Latin America a Public
Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC). Press Release, WHO, WHO
Statement on the First Meeting of the Int'l Health Regulations (2005) (IHR 2005)
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international legal architecture for global health security, have
contributed little to enhancing international cooperation. While many
reasons explain why international infectious disease regimes remain
ineffective, 6 scholars generally agree that the lack of enforcement
mechanisms provided by the IHR renders the instrument, at best,
7
symbolic.
In response to the widely recognized WHO leadership failure,
proposals outlining more responsive mechanisms both inside and
outside the WHO governance framework have emerged. The World
Bank, for instance, is developing a global Pandemic Emergency
Facility (PEF) in collaboration with the WHO, private sector health
companies, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).8 Chancellor
Merkel, in contrast, is advocating for an autonomous body with an
independent budget within the WHO. 9 In response to the wave of
universal criticism on its poor performance, the WHO announced the
creation of a global health workforce reserve and a new $100 million
contingent fund, aimed to facilitate rapid deployment and mobilization
of medical staff and resources during the early phase of infectious
disease control. 10
At a glimpse, the wave of initiatives and programs aimed at
strengthening global health security is, no doubt, a welcome, if not
overdue exercise. In particular, international infectious disease control
tends to occupy a place low on the political priority list once the crisis
is perceived to be over. However, at the governance level, the
mushrooming of new financing initiatives outside of the WHO
governance framework is also at risk of undermining the WHO's
normative authority, which is necessary for commanding and
coordinating international responses during global health crises. While
the wave of proposed initiatives reflects a general discontent with the
WHO, the world is also at a critical juncture where the global infectious
disease regime is undergoing dramatic transformation. The emerging

Emergency Comm. on Zika Virus and Observed Increase in Neurological Disorders and
Neonatal Malformations (Feb. 1, 2016)
(http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2016/1st-emergency-committeezika/en/ [https://perma.cc/X9M7-VY6J] (archived Sept. 18, 2016)); Tikki Pang, Is the
Global Community Preparedfor FuturePandemics?A Need for Solidarity,Resources and
Stronger Governance, 8 EMO MOLECULAR MED. 587-88 (2016).
6.
Id.
7.
Id.
8.
Pandemic Emergency Facility: Frequently Asked Questions, WORLD BANK,
http://www.worldbank.org/er/topic/pandemics/brief/pandemic-emergency-facilityfrequently-asked-questions (last visited Sept. 18, 2016) [https://perma.cc/9U9Y-AYL9]
(archived Sept. 18, 2016).
9. Boseley, supra note 2; Merkel, supra note 2; see also Regional Comm. of WHO for
the Americas, Resolutions and Other Actions of Intergovernmental Organizations of
Interests to PAHO, T4 U.N. Doc. CD54/INF/6 (Aug. 17, 2015).
10. WHO, supra note 3.

20161

MAKING INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS WORK

935

Zika virus outbreak again demonstrates the necessity of a robust global
infectious disease control regime. " More importantly, from the
viewpoint of human rights, strengthening IHR enforcement would help
the most vulnerable, most in need, populations. Scholars argue that, in
cases where impoverished, ineffective, or failed states face
disproportionate burdens in the provision of health services, as in the
2014 Ebola outbreak, a better-coordinated WHO would, and should,
12
help close the gap.
Equally as many legal scholars and political scientists have noted
that the extent to which the WHO fulfills its constitutional mandate is
a measure of its institutional legitimacy; a more robust IHR would also
empower the WHO. Yet the emerging plethora of new actors and
initiatives occupying the global health landscape could complicate the
current legal order, fracture the already fragmented global governance
of health, and inadvertently weaken future international response to
infectious disease control. On the contrary, the emerging initiatives
signal a reawakening of global interest in international health
security; if these initiatives are properly coordinated and integrated
within the existing system, they could have an amplifying effect,
minimizing potential harms on the affected population.
In this context, the PEF, which will be administrated by the World
Bank-a historical rival of the WHO-is a promising financing
13
initiative that will transform the global infectious disease regime.
The PEF builds on the notion of risk pooling, which would help create
a new market for insuring global epidemic and pandemic risk. 14 While
the PEF could channel the funds necessary to finance efforts in
containing global epidemic outbreaks, if the PEF is not properly
integrated with the existing infectious disease control regime, it could
risk further undermining the coherence of the regime. Equally
concerning is one proposal currently under consideration with the PEF
that aims to link the level of insurance premium to a country's
preparedness, as measured against the benchmarks set by the WHO's
IHR. 15 While it is true that the uneven progress in strengthening
public health capacities limits the effectiveness of the IHR, the
proposed linkage would likely place a disproportionate burden on

11. Daniel R. Lucey & Lawrence 0. Gostin, The Emerging Zika Pandemic
Enhancing Preparedness,315 JAMA 865, 866 (2016).
12. Maria Merritt, Bioethics, Philosophy and Global Health, 7 YALE J. HEALTH
POL'Y, L. & ETHICS 273, 278 (2013).
13. Scott S. Brown, Kasturi Sen & Kristof Decoster, The Health Systems Funding
Platform and World Bank Legacy: the Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality, 9 GLOB.
HEALTH 9 (2013); Kamran Abbasi, The World Bank and World Health: Changing Sides,
318 BRIT. MED. J., 865-69 (1999); cf. Jennifer Ruger, The World Bank and Global Health:
Time for a Renewed Focus on Health Policy 68 J. EPIDEMIOL & CMTY. HEALTH 1 (2014).
14. WORLD BANK, supra note 8.
15. Id.
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failing or failed states, whose inabilities to develop the core capacities
required under the IHR are often complex.
This Article is an effort to move the dialogue beyond financing
global health emergencies and toward creating a more equitable
international infectious disease control regime. Instead of engaging in
a normative inquiry about what makes a more equitable regime, the
Article engages in a policy-driven inquiry into how to bring that about
and makes concrete recommendations. Specifically, the Article draws
attention to the IHR as a building block of a robust, responsive,
international infectious disease control regime. The Article also
demonstrates why empowering the WHO with (quasi-) enforceable
power over the IHR is essential in creating a more equitable
international infectious disease control regime. Instead of seeing the
ascending influence of the World Bank as a potential threat to the
normative authority of the WHO, as a channel to perpetuate the
existing asymmetrical power structure within the international legal
system, or as a potential source for causing further fracturing to the
global health landscape, this Article highlights the potential, and
mutually beneficial roles the World Bank and the WHO could play in
the realm of global health security. The Article takes a pragmatic view
and proposes an informal linkage between the IHR and the PEF to
strengthen the compliance of the former. Specifically, the Article draws
attention to the World Bank's unique expertise in mobilizing multisectorial financing, and argues that the World Bank's financial clout
could be used as leverage in enhancing the IHR's compliance rate,
while taking into account the varying capability of state parties to
comply with the IHR.
Drawing on the respective institutional strengths of both
organizations, the Article demonstrates that linking the PEF with the
IHR is a plausible way forward, both politically and institutionally.
Although many practitioners have expressed skepticism about states
agreeing to a more legally enforceable IHR the majority of participants
in a World Bank survey agreed that global infectious disease control is
one of the most pressing political concerns, which suggests that the
issue is politically ripe. 16 The Article further argues that, normatively,
the parametric trigger of the PEF should be determined by the WHO

16. Press Release, World Bank, Poll: Most Not Convinced World is Prepared for
Next
Epidemic
(June
15,
2015)
(http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/pressrelease/2015/07/23/poll-most-not-convinced-world-is-prepared-for-next-epidemic
[https://perma.cc/3SGD-C577] (archived Sept. 18, 2016)). Likewise, across the political
spectrum in the United States, both political liberals and conservatives public and
experts recognized that enhancing global health security also serves domestic selfinterest. See, e.g., The Future of U.S. Global Health Policy and Programs, HENRY J.
KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Jan. 20, 2016), http://kff.org/global-health-policy/event/thefuture-of-u-s-global-health-policy-programs/ [https://perma.cc/F2MY-MY44] (archived
Sept. 18, 2016).
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Director-General instead of by the technocrats at the World Bank.
There are at least five benefits to the IHR-PEF linkage: it would level
the playing field, enhance IHR compliance, ensure timely and coherent
global response to global health emergencies, draw attention to the
distributive impact of scarce economic and health resources in an
increasingly interconnected world, and, despite the widely perceived
failure of the IHR during the 2014 Ebola crisis, would also rejuvenate
and sustain interest in global security.
In addition to the normative benefits brought by the informal
linkage, this discussion is also particularly timely for two practical
reasons: First, the WHO has established a Review Committee to assess
and identify the weaknesses in global preparedness and responses to
international health emergencies. 17 One key task the Review
Committee was asked to address was how to incentivize states to better
prepare for international infectious disease control. 18 Second, the
emerging Zika outbreak in Latin America will need intensive resources
and an open channel of communication to effectively contain the
epidemic and a robust IHR will be central to that task.
This Article consists of four parts. Starting from the viewpoint
that the international control of infectious disease is essentially a
coordination game, the Article first briefly describes the 2014 Ebola
crisis that unfolded in West Africa, the epicenter of the outbreak. The
sketch critically reveals both the practical and normative necessity of
the WHO during global health emergencies. Part II describes the
WHO's constitutional mandate and its normative role in promoting
public health. The discussion herein paves the way for the remaining
section on the IHR-the governing global legal architecture for routine

17. In the aftermath of the 2014 Ebola crisis, WHO established a special UN
International Panel, the Review Committee on the Role of International Health
Regulations in the Ebola Outbreak and Response (Review Committee), to assess the
performance of the IHR and the possible use of sanctions and other mechanisms to
compel better compliance. Specifically, the Review Committee is asked to address
notification and related incentive to strengthen preparedness and responses for future
emergencies. See REPORT OF THE FIRST MEETING OF THE REVIEW COMMITTEE ON THE
ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (2005) IN THE EBOLA OUTBREAK AND

RESPONSE, WHO (Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.who.int/ihr/review
-committee-2016/IHRReviewCommitteeFirstMeetingReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/
UY3E-R3GV] (archived Sept. 18, 2016); The Review Committee on the Role of the
International Health Regulations (2005) in the Ebola Outbreak and Response, WHO,
http://www.who.int/ihr/review-committee-2016/en/
(last visited Aug. 28, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/2X56-KHKU] (archived Sept. 18, 2016).
18. In May 2015, the World Health Assembly requested that the WHO establish a
Review Committee to examine how the role of IHR in the Ebola outbreak, with a focus
on the effectiveness of the IHR with regard to related incentives, links to the Emergency
Response Framework. Press Release, WHO, World Health Assembly Gives WHO Green
Light to Reform Emergency and Response Programme (May 23, 2015)
(http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2015/wha-23-may-2015/en/
[https://perma.cc/53WH-UZFT] (archived Sept. 18, 2016)).
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public health protection. Part III takes a step back and provides a brief
historical account of the World Bank in the global domain of public
health. This overview describes the historical involvement of
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) in developmental aids,
which adversely shaped its recipient countries' public health systems,
and, at times, competed with the WHO's mission in public health. The
discussion herein lays the groundwork for the IHR-PEF linkage
proposal, discussed in the ensuing section. The Article takes a cautious,
but not pessimistic, view of IFIs' involvement in global health. Part IV
first describes the World Bank's new financial mechanism, the PEF,
and then outlines the proposal of linking the PEF with the IHR. The
Article demonstrates that the proposal is both a politically plausible
and practically desirable solution by reference to the International Law
(IL) and International Relations (IR) literature on compliance-the
focus of the remainder of Part IV. The Article argues that such linkage
would create a synergetic relationship between the two institutions, in
addition to embedding public health norms in the international
system. The final section concludes.
A. Definitional Matters
The remainder of this Section introduces the conceptual
vocabulary that grounds the rest of the discussion; in particular, it
focuses on three working definitions: "global governance for health,"
"failed" or "failing state," and "compliance." The aim is to provide a
preliminary definition of these terms that will add clarity to the
discussion that follows.
1. Global Governance for Health
Scholars generally agree that "global health" refers to
transnational health issues that require collective action from a
myriad of actors, but scholars use a variety of terms to describe the
governance of global health, namely, "global health governance,"
"governance for global health," and "global governance for health."
Former Dean of Harvard School of Public Health, Julio Frenk, and
Suerie Moon, 19 for instance, use the term "global health governance"
to emphasize the interdependence of the global population and draw
attention to the wealth of processes that shape the way in which issues
of global significance are addressed collectively through formal and
21
informal political processes. 20 Similarly, Professor Lawrence Gostin

19. Julio Frenk & Suerie Moon, Governance Challenges in Global Health, 368 NEW
ENG. J. MED., 936-37 (2013).
20. Id.
21.
See LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN, GLOBAL HEALTH LAW 508 (2014).
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adopts the broader perspective, but uses the working definition of
"global governance for health" instead. The term "global governance for
health" analytically denotes "the collection of rules, norms,
institutions, and processes that shape the health of the world's
population. Governance strategies aim to organize divergent
stakeholders, and mange social, economic, and political affairs, to
improve global health and narrow health inequalities. ' 22 For Professor
Ilona Kickbusch, 23 by contrast, these three terms-global health
governance, governance for global health, and global governance for
health-each encapsulate a distinct political sphere, and collectively
define the global public health domain. 24 This Article uses Professor
Gostin's working definition of "global governance for health," which
emphasizes stakeholder participation and the aspiration to improve
global health and narrow health inequalities.
2. Failed or Failing State
While scholars disagree widely on what precisely constitutes a
failed state, scholars generally characterize a failing state by its
inability to provide basic political and social goods to its people. 25 A
failed or failing state also tends to have a collapsed, or non-existent
health system, making the controlling and monitoring of the spread of
disease even more challenging. 26 A dysfunctional national health
system helps perpetuate a vicious cycle of poverty and insecurity,
contributing to a decline in health indicators such as mortality and life
expectancy. 27 An outbreak in an African country where local health
care is non-existent can have devastating consequences nationally and
internationally. In fact, according to former WHO Director-General Dr.
Gro Harlem Brundtland, not even war or famine can have an effect on
28
societies as devastating and destabilizing as HIV/AIDS has had.

22.
23.

See id.
Ilona Kickbusch & Martina Marianna Cassar Szabo, A New Governance Space
for
Health,
GLOBAL
HEALTH
ACTION
(Feb.
13,
2014),
http:/lwww.globalhealthaction.net/index.php/gha/article/view/23507/html
[https://perma.cc/R8U2-U7BU] (archived Sept. 18, 2016).
24. Id.
25. Robert I. Rotberg, Failed and Weak States in Theory and Practice, OXFORD
BIBLIOGRAPHIES (May 4, 2015), http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/
obo-9780199756223/obo-9780199756223-0119.xml [https://perma.cc/6AFMK5G9] (archived Sept. 18, 2016).
26. Id.
27.
Lawrence 0 Gostin, Ebola: Towards an International Health Systems Fund,
384 THE LANCET e49-e50 (2014).
28. New Global Challenges: Health and Security from HIV to SARS, WHO (July
18, 2003), http://www.who.intldg/brundtland/speechesl2003/genevasecuritypolicylenl
[https://perma.cc/9P7F-364X] (archived Sept. 18, 2016).
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Under this definition, Guinea, Sierra Leona, and Liberia, with their
non-existent health systems, can be qualified as failed or failing states.
3. Compliance
"Compliance" means different things for International Law (IL)
and International Relations (IR) scholars. 29 For the former,
"compliance" means the degree to which a state's conduct conforms to
the prescribed legal standard in an agreement. 30 In contrast, the latter
uses the term as a proxy to gauge the extent to which institutions and
their legal rules are able to change state behaviors.3 1 How "compliance"
is defined informs the intellectually divergent ways in which IL and IR
scholars understand international law. The institutional effect that
political scientists describe as compliance is what legal scholars
distinguish as "effectiveness," which differs conceptually from the legal
notion of "compliance." For legal scholars, compliance and effectiveness
are two analytically related, but conceptually distinct terms. 32 That is,
unlike "compliance," "effectiveness" refers to the extent to which a
given regulation solves the political problem at hand.
Legal scholars use "effectiveness" to describe how international
law shapes state behavior. To gauge the effectiveness of international
law, IL scholars ask what the situation would have been in the absence
of that law. 33 The conceptual distinction between compliance and
effectiveness allows a finer-grain of understanding of whether, and
how, international law shapes state behavior. Distinguishing
"compliance" from "effectiveness" is also particularly useful in the

29. Lisa L. Martin, Against Compliance, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF ART 477-501
(Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds., 2013); cf. Oona Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro,
Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and InternationalLaw, 121 YALE L.J. 252, 252349 (2001) (discussing "outcasting" which denies disobedient states the benefits of social
cooperation and membership). For an overview on the disciplinary divide between the
IR and IL approaches toward international law see generally Jeffrey Dunoff & Mark
Pollack, Reversing Field: What can InternationalRelations Learn from International
Law?,
(Temple
Univ.
Legal
Studies
Research
Paper
No.
2012-14),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2037299
[https://perma.cc/JF4G-J5TB] (archived Oct. 8, 2016).
30.
See, e.g., Jana von Stein, The Engines of Compliance, in INTERDISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF

ART 477-501 (Jeffrey Dunoff& Mark Pollack eds., 2013); Alexander Thompson, Coercive
Enforcement of International Law, in
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF ART 502-23

(Jeffrey Dunoff & Mark Pollack eds., 2013).
31. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International
Law, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1823, 1840-60 (2002).
32.
Jutta Brunn6e & Stephen J. Toope, Constructivism and InternationalLaw, in
INTERDISCIPLINARY

PERSPECTIVES

ON

INTERNATIONAL

LAW

AND

INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS: THE STATE OF ART 119-45 (Jeffrey Dunoff & Mark Pollack eds., 2013).
33.

Id.
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examination of the role IHR plays in delivering global health
security. 34 Strong states, for example, tend to have robust public
health capability-a core IHR requirement-which they achieved
independently, in spite of the obligation stipulated by the IHR. Thus,
in this instance, the compliance of strong states with the core IHR
requirement, at best, is an epiphenomenon to the IHR. To that effect,
the Article will focus on enhancing the effectiveness of the IHR instead
of focusing on the IHR's compliance rate. Likewise, legal scholar
Timothy Meyer argues that over-emphasizing compliance may
understate the effectiveness of international law in changing state
behavior. 35 In the same vein, "implementation" is a concept related to
compliance, but refers to the administrative process by which states
internalize their international obligations. By contrast, "enforcement"
refers to the existence of sanctions or material consequences.
B. Background: The 2014 Ebola Crisis in West Africa
The Ebola outbreak of 2014 is the largest and the most complex
Ebola outbreak to date. 36 Formally known as Ebola hemorrhagic fever,
the disease is often fatal if left untreated, with an average fatality rate
of 50 percent. 37 Ebola is transmitted through human-to-human
exchange of bodily fluids, and contact with surfaces and materials (e.g.,
bedding, clothing, or needles) contaminated with the bodily fluids of
infected individuals. Healthcare workers are particularly vulnerable to
infection while treating patients with suspected or confirmed Ebola
virus disease (EVD). 38 Precautionary infectious disease control, if
strictly practiced, mitigates this risk significantly. 39 EVD has an

34. Timothy Meyer, How Compliance Understates Effectiveness, ASIL UNBOUND
(June 18, 2014), http://www.asil.org/blogs/how-compliance-understates-effectiveness
[https://perma.cc/RP9V-5ZRZ] (archived Sept. 18, 2016); see also Ebola Response Panel
Studying Ways to Enforce Compliance with Key UN Legal Health Instrument, UN NEWS
(Aug. 26, 2015), http://www.in.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=
51730#.VkLfniu2W3g [https://perma.cc/Z3KY-YNG4] (archived Sept. 18, 2016) (stating
that a panel has been established to discuss better methods of compliance).
35. Meyer, supra note 34.
36.
2014 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa, CTRS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION
(CDC),
http:/Iwww.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-westafrica/index.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2016) [https://perma.cc/63AE-T5XC] (archived
Sept. 18,2016).
37.
Ebola Virus Disease,WHO, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets
fs103/en (last visited Sept. 17, 2016) [https://perma.cc/M8T3-F5ZH] (archived Sept. 18,
2016).
38. About Ebola HemorrhagicFever, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/
about.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2016) [https://perma.cc/Z4RX-GL6Z] (archived Sept. 18,
2016).
39. See Transmission:Ebola HemorrhagicFever, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/
ebola/transmission/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2016) [https://perma.cc/26LB-G898] (archived
Sept. 18, 2016) (explaining how Ebola is transmitted).
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incubation period of two to twenty-one days, meaning that infected
individuals are not infectious until symptoms develop, but they remain
infectious as long as their blood contains the virus. 40 Burial of an
infected person also increases the transmission of the disease if
mourners have direct contact with the body of the deceased. 41
Currently, there are no licensed Ebola vaccines available, but two
42
potential vaccines are undergoing human safety trials.
The 2014 Ebola outbreak first appeared in a two-year old boy who
was living near Guinea's border with Liberia and Sierra Leone. 43 The
boy fell ill on December 6, 2013, but, due to a Guinean health officials'
unfamiliarity with the disease, Ebola remained undiagnosed until
March 21, 2014. By then, Ebola had spread to Liberia and Liberian
officials confirmed the presence of the disease two days after Guinea's
confirmation. In the meantime, scientists in Sierra Leone also
suspected Ebola had emerged there, which was later confirmed as
linked to an unsafe burial practice of a traditional healer held in March
in Guinea. The information was not picked up by Sierra Leone's
surveillance system until May. By late June, Ebola was confirmed in
sixty locations across Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. Overwhelmed
and understaffed, M~decins Sans Front~res (MSF, also known as
Doctors without Borders), the only international, independent medical
humanitarian organization treating affected individuals at that point,
issued a warning on June 21, 2014 that Ebola "was out of control,"
calling for a "massive deployment of resources" to contain the

40. Signs and Symptoms, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/symptoms/
index.html (lastvisited Sept. 17, 2016) [https://perma.ccYJ4V-58PW] (archived Sept. 18,
2016).

41.
New WHO Safe and Dignified Burial Protocol - Key to Reducing Ebola
Transmission, WHO, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/notes/2014/ebola-burialprotocol/en/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2016) [https://perma.cc/9RJ9-UBH9] (archived Sept.
18, 2016).
42. Ebola
Vaccines,
Therapies,
and
Diagnostics,
WHO,
http://www.who.int/medicines/emp-ebola-q-as/en]
(last visited Sept. 17, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/ER59-HS5H] (archived Sept. 18, 2016); Ebola Virus Disease (EVD)
Information
for
Clinicians
in
U.S.
Healthcare
Settings,
CDC,
http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/healthcare-us/preparing/clinicians.html (last visited Sept.
17, 2016) [https://perma.cc/743Z-W5L7] (archived Sept. 18, 2016); see also NIAID Role in
Ebola and Marburg Research, NAT'L INST. OF ALLERGY AND INFECTIOUS DISEASE,

http://www.niaid.nih.gov/topics/ebolamarburg/research/pages/default.aspx (last visited
Sept. 11, 2016) [https://perma.cc/9LB8-YD7J] (archived Sept. 18, 2016) (discussing
NIAID's research regarding a vaccine for Ebola).
43.
See Rebecca Davis, Ebola Epidemic 2014: Timeline, GUARDIAN (Oct. 15, 2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/15/ebola-epidemic- 2014-timeline
[https://perma.cc/W9AB-J8D8] (archived Sept. 18, 2016); Ebola Features Map, WHO,
http://www.who.int/features/ebola/storymap/en/
(last visited
Sept.
10,
2016)
[https://perma.cc/WSC7-FK9H] (archived Sept. 18, 2016) (depicting the regional area of
the outbreak).
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unprecedented scale and rapid spread of Ebola. 44 The dire situation in
these three most affected countries could not be understated, and was
made worse by the lack of external financial and technical support.
Liberia, for instance, had fifty-two registered medical doctors for a
population of 4.5 million; 45 MSF was forced to turn away patients
46
because of inadequate space and staff.
While Ebola has periodically erupted in the region since the 1970s,
no outbreak had been recorded until 2014, and it would take until July
of 2014 for the international community to take MSF's warning
seriously. By then, Ebola had spread to Senegal, Mali, the United
47
States, and the United Kingdom, but was controlled in those areas.
However, the virus had also spread to Nigeria and visibly crippled the
worst-affected countries in West Africa: Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra
Leone. On August 8, the WHO finally declared the outbreak, which had
by now killed nearly one thousand people, making it a Public Health
Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) under the IHR. 48 Yet it
was not until September, when the United Nations established its
Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER) which directly
answered to UN Secretary-General Bi-Ki Moon, that the international
community responded to MSF's humanitarian pleas-first made in
June-with real, substantial actions. 49 Two of the largest contributors,
the United States and the World Bank, mobilized three thousand
troops, who supported logistics, trained health workers, built
seventeen treatment centers, mobilized financing for training of

44. Ebola in West Africa: Epidemic Requires Massive Deployment of Resources,
MEDECINS SANS FRONTItRES (MSF) INT'L, http://www.msf.org/article/ebola-west-africaepidemic-requires-massive-deployment-resources
(last visited Sept. 11, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/Q6P6-MYVS] (archived Sept. 18, 2016).
45. LIBERIA INSTITUTE OF STATISTICS AND GEO-INFORMATION SERVICES
MONROVIA, LIBERIA, LIBERIA DEMOGRAPHIC AND HEALTH SURVEY 2013 PRELIMINARY
REPORT (Oct. 2013), http://www.unicef.org/liberia/LiberiaDHS_2013 _PreliminaryReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CHL-K2TA] (archived Sept. 18, 2016).
46. Ebola: Pushed to the Limit and Beyond - MSF report, MSF UK,
http://www.msf.org.uk/article/ebola-pushed-to-the-limit-and-beyond-msf-report
(last
visited Sept. 17, 2016) [https://perma.cc/U2MY-GRAA (archived Sept. 18, 2016); Erika
Check Hayden, Ebola Outbreak Thrusts MSF into New Roles, NAT. NEWS & COMMENT
(June 3, 2015), http://www.nature.com/news/ebola-outbreak-thrusts-msf-into-new-roles1.17690 [https://perma.cc/PQ7H-ZQZY] (archived Sept. 18, 2016).
47.
Hayden, supra note 46.
48. Statement on the 1s Meeting of the IHR Emergency Committee on the 2014
Ebola Outbreak in West Africa, WHO, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/
statements/2014/ebola-20140808/en/(last visited Sept. 17, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/AV8U-9WY9] (archived Sept. 18, 2016).
49. See UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER): Lessons Learned,
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/pga/70/2015/10/15/un-

mission-for-ebola-emergency-response-unmeer-lessons-learned/ (last visited Sept. 17,
2016) [https://perma.cc/M96G-C7HB] (archived Sept. 18, 2016).
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healthcare workers, purchased essential supplies, and raised funds for
50
capability building and post-Ebola recovery and reconstruction.
In practice, EVD can be contained efficiently within a robust
public health system and with an open channel of communication. 5 1
However, in post-conflict Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, fragile
public health systems, low health literacy, and inadequate health and
human resources accelerated the EVD transmission rate, which was
made worse by the deep distrust between governments and foreign aid
workers stemming from the long periods of civil conflict in these
countries. 52 Affected countries also hesitated in notifying the WHO
because of the economic and trade repercussions associated with
53
notification.
Increasingly isolated, the worst-affected countries in West Africa
resorted to extraordinary measures that many scholars argued were in
violation of international human rights. 54 Soon after Liberia's state of
emergency declaration, President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf authorized a
large-scale, military-led quarantine in West Point, Monrovia. 55
Instead of containing EVD efficiently, the quarantine measure
provoked fear and violence in a country that had just emerged from
long-term civil conflicts. 56 In Guinea, MSF's aid efforts were regularly

50.
Dion Nissenbaum & Julian E. Barnes, U.S. Militaryto EndAfrican Ebola Role,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-to-end-african-ebola-role1423612366 (subscription required) [https:/perma.cc/WWW6-3WTX] (archived Sept. 18,
2016); Fact Sheet: U.S. Response to the Ebola Epidemic in West Africa,
WHITEHOUSE.GOV,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/16/fact-sheetus-response-ebola-epidemic-west-africa (last visited Sept. 17, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/68F2-6BVE] (archived Sept. 18, 2016).
51. Gerald Amandu Matua, Dirk Mostert Van der Wal & Rozzano C. Locsin, Ebola
Hemorrhagic Fever Outbreaks: Strategies for Effective Epidemic Management,
Containment and Control, 19 BRAZ. J. INFECT. DiS. 308, 310-13 (2015).
52. Adia Benton & Kim Yi Dionne, InternationalPoliticalEconomy and the 2014
West African Ebola Outbreak, 58 AFR. STUD. REv. 223, 223-36 (2015).
53. World Health Organization, Ebola Interim Assessment Panel Report by the
Secretariat, 1 10 U.N. Doc. A68/25 (May 8, 2015) [hereinafter Ebola Interim Assessment
Panel Report]; Adele Faur, Transparency in the Time of Ebola: Encouragingthe Timely
Sharing of
Outbreak Data, AFR.
L.
&
BUS.
(June
23,
2015),
http://www.africanlawbusiness.com/news/5644-transparency-in-the-time-of-ebolaencouraging-the-timely-sharing-of-outbreak-data [https://perma.cc/Y9SN-GE83]
(archived Sept. 18, 2016).
54. James Hodge et al., Global Emergency Legal Responses to the 2014 Ebola
Outbreak: Public Health and the Law, 42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 595, 598-99 (2014).
55. Norimitsu Onishi, As Ebola Grips Liberia'sCapital,a QuarantineSows Social
Chaos, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/29/world/
africa/in-liberias-capital-an-ebola-outbreak-like-noother.html?rref=collection%/o2Ftimes
topic%2FJohnson%20Sirleaf2C%20Elen&action=click&contentCollection=timestopic
s&region=stream&module=stream unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=7&pgtype
=collection&_r-0 [https://perma.cc/MZ44-46H2] (archived Sept. 18, 2016).
56.
Benton & Dionne, supra note 52.
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met with fear, and sometimes hostility, from the local community. 57 In
Sierra Leone, loss of confidence in political leadership translated into
fear about the disease; some local residents believed that the disease
was a plot by the government to get humanitarian aid. 58 Violence
against foreign aid workers also stemmed in part from the locals'
unfamiliarity with the necessary EVD precautionary measures: aid
workers arrived in unfamiliar, spacesuit-like protective gear and
immediately removed the infected deceased bodies, further invoking
fear and panic. 59 In addition, health workers and patients who
survived Ebola were stigmatized, and treating EVD patients diverted
health resources away from the already strained health systems in
these countries.
With 77.9 million people in need of assistance worldwide as of
September 17, 2014, the UN Secretary-General noted that the dire
situation in Africa had escalated to a humanitarian crisis. 60
Specifically, the Security Council categorized the disease outbreak as
"a threat to international peace and security,"6 1 noting the political,
social, economic, humanitarian, logistical, and security dimensions of
the Ebola outbreak in West Africa. On September 18, the Security
Council adopted Resolution 2177 and, a day later, Secretary-General
Ban Ki-Moon announced the establishment of UNMEER, prompted

57.
The
Race
to
Control Ebola in Sierra Leone,
MSF
USA,
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/news-stories/field-news/race-control-ebola-sierraleone (last visited Sept. 17, 2016) [https://perma.cc/3XJX-Y8KD] (archived Sept. 18,
2016).
58.
Benton & Dionne, supra note 52.
59.
Laurie Garrett, Sierra Leone's Ebola Epidemic is Spiralling Out of Control,
FOREIGN POLY (Dec. 10, 2014), http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/12/10/sierra-leones-ebolaepidemic-is-spiraling-out-of-control/ [https://perma.cc/AND4-RVE5] (archived Sept. 18,
2016).
60.
See U.N. SCOR, 69th Sess., 7260th mtg., U.N. DOC. S/PV.7260 (Sept. 9, 2014);
Statement by the Secretary-General on the establishment of the United Nations Mission
for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER), U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL (Sept. 19, 2014),
https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2014-09-19/statement-secretarygeneral-establishment-united-nations-mission [https://perma.cc/X2CU-8ZN2] (archived
Sept. 19, 2016); Press Release, Security Council, Adopting Resolution 2176 (2014),
Security Council Approves Three-Month Extension for United Nations Mission in
Liberia, With Further Renewal under Review, U.N. Press Release SC/11559 (Sept. 14,
2014)
(www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2014/sc 1559.doc.htm
[https:I/perma.cc7YCJQYFL] (archived Sept. 19, 2016)) (authorizing the extension for UN Mission and urging
an increased international response); Press Release, Security Council, Security Council
Press Statement on United Nations Office for West Africa, U.N. Press Release SC/11466AFR/2930
(July
9,
2014)
(www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11466.doc.htm
[https://perma.cc/2M6H-366G] (archived Sept. 19, 2016)); UN Mission for Ebola
Emergency Response, GLOBAL EBOLA RESPONSE, http://ebolaresponse.un.org/unmission-ebola-emergency-response-unmeer
(last
visited
Sept.
18,
2016)
[https://perma.cc/TXK2-Q9SU] (archived Sept. 19, 2016) [hereinafter UN Mission for
Ebola Emergency Response] (discussing the first ever UN emergency health mission).
61. S.C. Res. 2177, 1 (Sept. 18, 2014).
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largely by the international leadership vacuum. 62 Significantly,
Resolution 2177 formally marked the first time that the Security
Council recognized a disease outbreak as a threat to international
peace and security, and the second time that the Security Council had
dealt directly with a public health concern (the first being the
HIV/AIDS epidemic).
Importantly, UNMEER was established to provide immediate
disaster relief to affected countries in West Africa. Hence, UNMEER,
an innovative UN-led emergency health mission deployed under
Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon's authority, was neither a
"peacekeeping operation" nor a "political mission. '6 3 Instead, as
Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon explained, the Mission "harness[es]
the capabilities and competencies of all the relevant United Nations
actors under a unified operational structure to reinforce unity of
purpose, effective ground-level leadership and operational direction in
order to ensure a rapid, effective, efficient, and coherent response to
64
the crisis."
In spite of the fact that, historically, the WHO assumes the
coordination function of health matters among the UN agencies, as
mandated by its Constitution, the WHO was notably absent during the
initial response phase of the 2014 Ebola outbreak. Several reasons
explain the WHO's conspicuous absence: first, the organization lacked
the necessary financial resources to lead the international response;
second, it could not command authority from states and non-state
actors; and, third, structurally, the WHO is not designed to carry out
ground-level support work.
This leadership vacuum during the initial response phase
prompted the United Nations to take over the humanitarian mission
in West Africa. 65 Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon solemnly observed
that "[n]o one country or organization had the resources to stem the
tide of the Ebola crisis. '66 Such a comment is even more profound in

62. UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response, supra note 60.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Ban Launches UN Ebola Response Mission; Advance Teams to Arrive in West
Africa on Monday UN News Service Section, UN NEWS (Sept. 20, 2014),
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=48760#.Vlulu7-2W3g
[https://perma.cc/S9F3-KT6N] (archived Sept. 19, 2016).
66.
THE ROLE OF WHO WITHIN THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION FOR EBOLA
EMERGENCY RESPONSE REPORT OF THE SECRETARIAT, WHO,
7 (Apr. 2015),

http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/ebola/who-unmeer.pdfua=l
[https://perma.cc/8SHX-7CF7] (archived Sept. 19, 2016); see Press Release, WHO
Welcomes Decision to Establish United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response
(Sept. 19, 2014) (www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2014/ebola -emergencyresponse/en! [https://perma.cc/33XS-V34C] (archived Sept. 19, 2016)) (stating the need
for the UN initiative because it was a social, humanitarian, and economic crisis); UN
Mission for Ebola Emergency Response, supra note 60 (discussing the need to support
the governments of Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone).
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light of the fact that a number of agencies with public health missions
have appeared recently in the global health sphere. Yet, despite the
fact that the global health terrain is now occupied by numerous
agencies with overlapping public health mandates-local ministries of
health in Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone; MSF; the U.S. Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention; UNICEF; bilateral aid agencies; and
private philanthropies-mobilizing the relevant agencies remained
challenging during the initial stage of the international response.
While the interdependency between global health and the
attainment of international peace and security is strongly referenced
in the WHO's Constitution and is a repeated theme in the WHO's
work,6 7 UNMEER, which answers directly to Secretary-General Ban
Ki-Moon, formally converged public health and international security
interests at the UN level. In theory, UNMEER complements the
WHO's work by providing its expertise in humanitarian relief, but, in
practice, the lack of communication among the international agencies
and the local communities created confusion and further delayed the
emergency response. 68 UNMEER, for instance, remained a disaster
relief mission operationally, and transported quantities of food instead
of the medical supplies needed in the worst-affected countries. 69 On the
other hand, the WHO had little logistical experience in West Africa,
and, during the initial phase of the outbreak, the Geneva-based
technocrats formulating the disease control response overlooked the
basic fact that medical staff at the ground-level did not have enough
essential medical supplies, for example, latex gloves, protective gowns,
and rehydrating fluid. 70 The disconnect between the local needs and
the global response was devastating: the lack of protective gear for
healthcare workers had resulted in 512 deaths of EVD-infected health
care workers in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone as of January 14,
2016.71 Moreover, the mobilization of UNMEER was also hugely

67.

See

CONST.

OF

THE

WORLD

HEALTH

ORGANIZATION

(1946),

http://apps.who.int/gb/bd/PDF/bd48/basic-documents-48th-edition-en.pdf#page=7
[https://perma.ccVJR4-HPW8] (archived Sept. 19, 2016), reprinted in WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION BASIC DOCUMENTS 1 (48th ed. 2014) ("The health of all peoples is
fundamental to the attainment of peace and security and is dependent upon the fullest
co-operation of individuals and States."); G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 22, Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948) (stating that everyone has a right to
security through international cooperation).
68. Benton & Dionne, supra note 52.
69. Press Release, Security Council, With Spread of Ebola Outpacing Response,
Security Council Adopts Resolution 2177 (2014) Urging Immediate Action, End to
Isolation of Affected States, U.N. Press Release SC/11566 (Sept. 14, 2014)
(http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11566.doc.htm [https://perma.cc/LSL9-7U9G]
(archived Sept. 19, 2016)).
70. S.C. Res. 2177, supra note 61, at 4.
71.

Ebola in Africa: The End of a Tragedy?, ECONOMIST (Jan. 14, 2016),

http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/O1/daily-chart-12
[https://perma.cc/DFA9-SBK9] (archived Sept. 19, 2016).
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expansive, far exceeding the WHO's interventions: the estimated cost
72
for the operation was $19 million, with $3.3 million unaccounted for.
Unfamiliarity with the local culture and tradition also made the
73
implementation of standard EVD treatment difficult.
To their credit, the three worst-affected countries activated their
national emergency committees early in the outbreak, but limited
experience with EVD weakened their emergency response plans
significantly.7 4 Many commentators also pointed out that most of the
measures taken by these governments had little impact in containing
EVD but had a huge impact on human rights. 75 Without a normative
guide, affected West African countries implemented measures that
fomented a climate of fear, which was aggravated by the lack of
effective communication between the government and the affected
population, further delaying effective containment of EVD. The lack of
normative
guidance
at the
ground level
also impaired
nongovernmental organizations' response efforts considerably, which
were further complicated by inadequate coordination mechanisms
76
between the state and non-state actors' responses.
Additionally, the countries affected had little incentive to notify
the WHO, mainly because the affected governments feared the
economic and political repercussions stemming from their
notification. 77 Such concern was not groundless. After the WHO's
PHEIC declaration, Australia and Canada announced travel
restrictions on entry for residents from Liberia, Sierra Leone, and
Guinea, 78 in spite of the fact that, with robust public health systems in

72. See Press Release, General Assembly, Fifth Committee Concerned by TopHeavy Structure, Resource Distribution in Ebola Response Mission, Proposed Budget
Cuts to Darfur Peacekeeping, U.N. Press Release GA/AB/4141 (Dec. 18, 2014)
(http://www.un.org/press/erI2014/gaab4141.doc.htm
[https://perma.cc/DM2M-RTRR]
(archived Sept. 19, 2016)).
73. See Monica Mark, As Ebola Epidemic Tightens Grip, West Africa Turns to
Religion for Succour, GUARDIAN (Oct. 17, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/
2014/oct/17/ebola-epidemic-west-africa-religion-church-virus -transmission
[https://perma.cc/8S6S-ZUEP] (archived Sept. 19, 2016) (discussing the role of religion
in Africa in regards to Ebola).
74. See, e.g., Hodge et al., supranote 54.
75.
West Africa: Respect Rights in Ebola Response, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 15,
2014), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/09/15/west-africa-respect-rights-ebola-response
[https://perma.cc/S4WP-CCEA] (archived Sept. 19, 2016); Elizabeth Cohen et al.,
Quarantined Nurse Slams State Ebola Policy, CNN
(Oct. 26, 2014),
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/10/26/health/new-jersey-quarantined-nurse/
[https://perma.cc/E5MG-BU8B] (archived Sept. 19, 2016).
76. See Jenny Lei Ravelo, Help Row, Not Steer: Lessons from the Ebola Crisis
Response, DEVEX (June 30, 2015), https://www.devex.com/news/help-row-not-steerlessons-from-the-ebola-crisis-response-86451 [https://perma.cc/42BU-PVXD] (archived
Sept. 19, 2016) (discussing the importance of feedback and coordination).
77.
Ebola Interim Assessment Panel Report, supra note 53, at 32.
78.
See Australia Suspends Visas for People Travelling from Ebola-hit Countries,
BBC NEWS (Oct. 27, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-29783106
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place, these two countries were at extremely low risk. Furthermore,
with Resolution 2177 formally marking the 2014 Ebola outbreak as an
international security issue, some commentators were wary that such
categorization would imply that infected EVD patients were not
79
dissimilar to political motivated terrorists.

II. THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION

The 2014 Ebola outbreak critically exposed the WHO's
institutional weaknesses in coordinating an international response to
control the spread of transnational infectious diseases, despite the fact
that such a mandate falls squarely within its constitutional and
normative authority.80 Prompted by the WHO's apparent leadership
failure, several new institutions and initiatives outside of the WHO
governance framework have emerged, most notably, UNMEER,
created by the United Nations, and the PEF, which is housed in the
World Bank. The United States has also taken international steps with
the launch of a Global Health Security Agenda to close the gaps in
global governance. 8 ' The emergence of these initiatives highlights an
idiosyncratic interest in global health security, which remains one of
the WHO's cardinal responsibilities, but the leadership vacuum during
the initial phase of the outbreak calls the WHO's capability to address
international health security into question. Equally, many
commentators are concerned that the creation of new institutions could
risk undermining the WHO's authority considerably, further
fragmenting the global governance of health. 82

[https://perma.cc/5JAH-3NQP] (archived Sept. 19, 2016); Ebola Outbreak: Canada
Turned 176 People Away After Imposing Travel Ban, CBC NEWS (Dec. 31, 2014),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/health/ebola-outbreak-canada-turned- 176-people-away-afterimposing-travel-ban-1.2887673 [https://perma.cc/4DV7-SL6P] (archived Sept. 19, 2016);
see also UN Security Council Criticizes DiscriminationAgainst Those from Ebola-hit
Regions, GUARDIAN (Nov. 22, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/22/
ebola a-threat-to-international-peace- and-security-says-julie-bishop [https://perma.cc/
5MJA-VPKG] (archived Sept. 19, 2016) (discussing the UN security council criticizing
countries issuing travel restrictions).
79.
Gian Luca Burci & Jakob Quirin, Ebola, WHO, and the United Nations:
Convergence of Global Public Health and International Peace and Security, AM. SOC.
INT'L
L.,
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/18/issue/25/ebola-who-and-unitednations-convergence-global-public-health-and
(last
visited
Sept.
18,
2016)
[https://perma.cc/9CVR-KDAN] (archived Sept. 19, 2016).
80. CONST. OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, supra note 67.
81.
GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY AGENDA, https://www.ghsagenda.org/ (last visited
Sept. 17, 2016) [https://perma.cc/LW22-6SHK] (archived Sept. 26, 2016).
82. See generally Lawrence 0. Gostin et. al, The Joint Action and Learning
Initiative on National and Global Responsibilities for Health, (World Health Report
Background Paper No. 53, 2010) (explaining that global health institutions do not
coordinate and thus cause further fragmentation).
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Most fundamentally, new institutions also raise a question about
the proper role of the WHO in a crowded global health landscape, a
question to which the Article now turns. In order to shed light on these
issues, this Part outlines the WHO's normative authority, highlighting
that, with an (almost) universal membership and amiable
constitutional and normative authority, the WHO is uniquely
positioned to lead an international response in global health
emergencies. That said, the ability of the WHO to lead is also
constrained by the political-economic landscape in which the agency
operates. Examining the structural deficiencies that handicap the
WHO's operations paves the way for later discussion on strengthening
the enforcement mechanisms of the IHR.
A. The WHO's Normative Visions
The WHO, established in 1948 in the aftermath of World War II,
is driven by a strong, collective recognition of the need to improve
health worldwide.8 3 Despite the recent expansion of new global health
actors in the global health landscape, the WHO remains the principal
international organization charged with addressing the threat of
emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases affecting global health
security. The WHO Constitution and the UN Charter establish the
organization as the specialized health agency within the UN system,
bestowing upon the organization a normative and constitutional
authority in global health that is unparalleled in comparison to other
UN agencies involved in health.8 4 Article 1 of the WHO Constitution
explicitly recognizes that the purpose of the organization "shall be the
'8 5
attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health.
Likewise, upon its establishment, Member States granted the WHO an
extensive scope of authority so that the organization could fulfill its
86
constitutional mandate.
This need to coordinate international response to transnational
infectious disease control in part explains the granting of extensive
authority to the WHO by its Member States in the establishment of the

83. Sze, supra note 1; see David McCoy, Sudeep Chand & Devi Sridhar, Global
Health Funding.How Much, Where It Comes From and Where It Goes, 24 HEALTH POL'Y
PLAN. 407, 412 (2009) (discussing WHO spending on healthcare, other organizations that
provide health care, and research).
84. Lawrence. 0. Gostin, Devi Sridhar & Daniel Hougendobler, The Normative
Authority of the World Health Organization,129 PUB. HEALTH 854, 854 (2015).
85.
CONST. OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, supra note 67, at art. 1.
86.

GAN

LUCA

BURCI

&

CLAUDE-HENRI

VIGNES,

THE

WORLD

HEALTH

ORGANIZATION 124 (2004); Allyn Taylor, Making the World Health Organization Work:
A Legal Frameworkfor UniversalAccess to the Conditionsfor Health, 18 AM. J. L. & MED.
301, 328 (1992).
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agency.8 7 Prior to the creation of the WHO, public health governance
was "Westphalian," meaning that no superior authority existed over
sovereign states, and each state reigned over its own people by virtue
of social contract. 88 But countries plagued by epidemics found it
difficult to contain the diseases without coordinated agreements
between national governments and standardized national quarantine
measures. 89 The first International Sanitary Conference, held in Paris
in 1851, for instance, recognized the necessity of international
cooperation in implementing uniform measures with minimal
interference to cross-border trade activities. 90 International standards
not only harmonize national behavior but also ensure that states can
reasonably expect that other states will undertake proportionate
quarantine responses. A coordinated response is critical, if not highly
desirable, in controlling the international spread of infectious diseases,
delivering public assurance, and ensuring minimal interruption of
international traffic. An international infectious disease control regime
grounded in predictability and certainty, thus, was born.
B. The WHO's ConstitutionalFunctions
The preamble of the WHO Constitution enshrines a collective
aspiration to secure the "enjoyment of the highest attainable standard
of health" for all. 91 However, since its establishment, the grand vision
of the WHO's founders has become less and less achievable with each
passing decade. Consequently, public health practitioners and scholars
who are critical of the WHO tend to downplay the normative force of
the Preamble.
Upon its establishment, the WHO inherited from the
International Health Office in Paris and the Health Section in
Geneva-both part of the League of Nations, the predecessor to the
United Nations-the cardinal responsibility for the control of
international spread of diseases. 92 Article 2 of the WHO Constitution

87.
Emilya Bruemmer & Allyn Taylor, Institutional Transparency in Global
Health Law-making: The World Health Organization and the Implementation of the
InternationalHealthRegulation, in TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 275 (Andrea
Bianchi & Anne Peters eds., 2013).
88.
David Fidler, Return of the Fourth Horseman: Emerging Infectious Diseases
and International Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 771 (1997) [hereinafter Fidler, Fourth
Horseman]; see David Fidler, The Role of InternationalLaw in the Control of Emerging
Infectious Diseases, 95 BULLETIN DE L'NSTITUT PASTEUR 57 (1997), reprinted in The
POLITICS OF EMERGING AND RESURGENT INFECTIOUS DISEASES 62-85 (Jim Whitman ed.,

2000) [hereinafter, Fidler, Role of InternationalLaw] (arguing a need for international
law to control emerging infectious diseases).
89. Fidler,FourthHorseman, supranote 88.
90. Fidler, Role of InternationalLaw, supra note 88, at 59.
91.

CONST. OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, supra note 67.

92.

Bruemmer & Taylor, supra note 87, at 276.

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 49.:931

outlines a range of the organization's twenty-two core functions, chief
among them is to "stimulate and advance work to eradicate epidemic,
endemic and other diseases .... -93 Article 2(a) provides that the WHO
will "act as the directing and co-coordinating authority on
international health work. '9 4 This has been characterized as a cardinal
function of the WHO in implementing the goals of the UN Charter
regarding health. Article 2(b) further affirms the WHO's coordinating
authority within the UN system, where the organization is tasked "to
establish and maintain effective collaboration with the United Nations,
specialized
agencies,
governmental
health
administrations,
professional groups and such organizations as may be deemed
appropriate."9 5 Article 2(d) provides that the WHO should "furnish
appropriate technical assistance and, in emergencies, necessary aid
upon the request or acceptance of Governments. 9 6s Beginning in 1947,
the WHO maintained a system of global epidemiological information
in accordance with Article 2(f), which mandates that the organization
"establish and maintain such administrative and technical services as
' 97
may be required, including epidemiological and statistic services.
The WHO is given extensive power to set international health
standards and to ensure their uniformity. Article 2(k), inter alia,
provides that the WHO will "propose conventions, agreements and
regulations, and make recommendations with respect to international
health matters and to perform such duties as may be assigned thereby
98
to the Organization and consistent with its objectives."
Insofar as the WHO is a technical-oriented agency, special focus
is placed on public health research and data collection. Article 2(n)
instructs the WHO "to promote and conduct research in the field of
health" 99 and Article 2(q) further obliges the WHO "to provide
information, counsel and assistance in the field of health." 10 0 Given
that the WHO is the largest international health organization, Article
2(u) stipulates that the WHO should "develop, establish and promote
international
standards
with respect
to food,
biological,
pharmaceutical and similar products." 10 1 Finally, Article 2(v) provides
that the WHO should "generally ...take all necessary action to attain
the objective of the Organization." 10 2 Evidently, the diverse and varied
functions of the WHO establish the organization as the leading global

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

CONST. OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, supra note 67, at art. 2
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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health agency, uniquely situated to address international public health
concerns.
Importantly, the Constitution also provides that the World Health
Assembly (WHA) "shall have authority to adopt regulations
concerning ...sanitary and quarantine requirements and other
103
procedures designed to prevent the international spread of disease."
The WHA adopted the 2005 IHR and its predecessors under Article 21
by a simple majority. 104 Accordingly, legal scholar Allyn Taylor
concludes that the WHO's normative power is a "fairly unique
lawmaking device in the international system." 10 5 The foundational
documents of the WHO suggest that the founders intended it to replace
the previous public health governance system, which was based on a
Westphalian governance system. The extensive power bestowed upon
the WHO to adopt conventions and regulations and set health-related
standards is central to policy integration and coherence at the
international level. Professor Taylor further argues that the WHO's
lawmaking power, when read together with Article 1, confers upon the
organization "the legal authority to serve as a platform
for ... agreements that potentially address all aspects of national and
global public health, as long as advancing human health is the primary
objective." 10 6 Hence, in the realm of global health security, the WHO's
normative power, along with its almost universal membership, places
the organization in a uniquely advantageous position, which many
scholars point out the WHO has yet to fully utilize in fulfilling its
10 7
constitutional mandate.
On the other hand, legal scholar David Fidler argues that the
WHO governance structure that emerged after the severe acute
respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic exhibited features of a
"constitutional outline,"10 8 which established the WHO as the highest
public health authority at the international level. Putting aside this
controversial claim for the moment, many scholars and practitioners
would agree that the 2014 Ebola outbreak shattered the ambitious
vision of the WHO that the founders envisaged. 109 While the WHO

103. Id.
104. World Health Assembly Res. WHA58.3, U.N. Doe. WHA58/2005/REC/1 at 7
(May 16-25, 2005) http://www.who.intlcsr/ihr/WHA58-en.pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/E2EN-8MZ3] (archived Sept. 19, 2016).
105. Allyn Taylor, InternationalLaw, and Public Health Policy, in INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF PUBLIC HEALTH, 675 (Kris Heggenhougen & Stella Quah eds., 2008);
see also Moon et al., supra note 5, at 2213-14 (discussing the need to develop a
framework of rules).
106. Bruemmer & Taylor, supra note 87, at 275.
107. See id.
108. David Fidler, ConstitutionalOutlines of Public Health's "New World Order",
77 TEMP. L. REV 247, 272 (2004).

109. WHO, MEDIUM-TERM STRATEGIC PLAN 2008-2013 (AMENDED DRAFT),
http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf-files/MTSP2009/MTSP3-en.pdf (last visited Sept. 18,
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remains a Member State-driven multilateral organization, the
political-economic landscape has changed significantly since the
WHO's inception. One critical feature of modern global governance is
that it has become polycentric. The WHO now competes with a myriad
of powerful, and often better-funded new players. States dissatisfied
with the WHO tend to circumvent the agency by funding alternative
institutions. 110 This has resulted in the creation of health-related UN
organizations such as the UN Children's Fund,11 1 the UN Population
113
Fund, 112 and the UN Development Programme (UNDP).
Beginning in the 1990s, the World Bank also became an
influential player in global health through its funding of development
projects. 114 Similarly, in the realm of specific disease management,
new initiatives such as the UN Joint Programme on HIV/AIDS
(UNAIDS), 115 the Global Alliance on Vaccines and Immunization
(GAVI), 116 and the Global Fund to Fight HIV/ AIDS, Tuberculosis and
Malaria (GFATM) 117 have emerged. These initiatives joined existing
and new bilateral arrangements, such as the U.S. President's
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), l l s the UK Department for
International Development, 119 and, most recently, the United States
launched the Global Health Security Agenda, partly in response to the

2016) [https://perma.cc/AXD4-T3W5] (archived Sept. 19, 2016) (discussing why the WHO
believed the IHR were insufficient); WHA Res. WHA63/2010/REC/1 (May 21, 2010),
http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf files/WHA63-REC1/WHA63_REC1-en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AP3X-AL68] (archived Sept. 19, 2016).
110. Declan Butler, Revamp The WHO, NATURE 473, 430-31 (2011).
111. CHILDREN'S RIGHTS & EMERGENCY RELIEF ORGANIZATION (UNICEF),
http://www.unicef.org/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2016) [https://perma.ccLB3Q-EVYZ]
(archived Sept. 19, 2016).
112. UNITED NATIONS POPULATION FUND (UNFPA), http://www.unfpa.org/ (last
visited Sept. 11, 2016) [https://perma.cc/3KKW-D7U9] (archived Sept. 19, 2016).
113. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (UNDP), http://www.undp.org/
(last visited Sept. 11, 2016) [https:/Hperma.cc/TX7Y-XA94] (archived Sept. 19, 2016).
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UN JOINT PROGRAMME ON HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), http://www.unaids.org/ (last

visited Sept. 11, 2016) [https://perma.cc/SKW2-MEBF] (archived Sept. 19, 2016).
116. GAVI, http://www.gavi.org/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/VK4D-DBRQ] (archived Sept. 16, 2016).
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http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2016) [https://perma.cc/BP22VNPG] (archived Sept. 19, 2016).
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http://www.pepfar.gov (last visited Sept. 18, 2016) [https://perma.cc/PGD3-GF3G]
(archived Sept. 19, 2016).
119. UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT WEBSITE, DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT, https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-

international-development (last visited Sept. 10, 2016) [https://perma.cc/87NB-G3ZY]
(archived Sept. 19, 2016).
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WHO's diminishing influence in global health. 120 The emergence of
new actors and agencies further undermines the WHO's ability to steer
a global health agenda. Well-funded philanthropies also exert
considerable influence in steering a global health agenda, most
notably, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, which has helped set
the governance agenda for global health. 121
With the plethora of actors occupying the increasingly crowded
global health terrain, investment in global health development aid
increased nearly eightfold from 1990-2010, going from $5.7 billion to
$26.9 billion. 122 Yet financially, the WHO did not benefit from the
increased global health funding. In fact, since 1993, the WHO's budget
has remained nominal. 123 Major donors' unwillingness to increase the
WHO's budget in part reflects a deep concern about the WHO and its
diminishing influence in global health. For 2014-2015, the WHO's
budget in infectious disease control was cut by $72 million, forcing the
WHO to reduce its personnel in the infectious disease unit. 124 The
WHO's $3.96 billion annual budget is hardly commensurate with the
tasks that the world bestowed upon the agency. 125 Moreover, with the
bulk 77 percent-of the WHO's budget coming from voluntary
contributions of Member States and other donors, earmarked for
specific projects, the WHO has little discretion to allocate its budget
126
apace with the global burden of diseases.

120. GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY AGENDA, supra note 81.
121. See
generally
BILL
&
MELINDA
GATES
FOUNDATION,
http://www.gatesfoundation.org/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2016) [https://perma.cc/9G8G6MZ9] (archived Sept. 19, 2016). For criticism on the influence the philanthropies on
global health agenda see for example Christopher G. Bradley, PartnerCapture in Public
International Organizations, 44 AKRON L. REv 261 (2011); Jeremy Youde, The
Rockefeller and Gates Foundations in Global Health Governance, 27 GLOBAL SOC'Y 2,
139-58 (2013). Recently, Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg announced the
establishment of the Chan Zuckerberg Initiative, with a focus on health. With the
announcement, Mark Zuckerberg and Priscilla Chan officially joined other high-profile
global health philanthropists such as Chelsea Clinton, the Vice Chair of the Bill, Hillary
and Chelsea Clinton Foundation, Barbara Pierce Bush, the co-founder and President of
Global Health Corps, and former New York City mayor Michael Bloomberg, of the
Bloomberg Philanthropies.
122. Paolo Piva & Rebecca Dodd, Where Did all the Aid Go? An In-depth Analysis of
Increased Health Aid Flows Over the Past 10 Years, 87 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 930
(2009).
123. R. van de Pas & L. G. van Schaik, Democratizing the World Health
Organization, 128 PUB. HEALTH 195, 195-201 (2014).
124. World Health Assembly, Programme Budget 2014-2015, U.N. Doc. WHA 66.2
(May 24, 2013).
125. See About the Global Burden of Disease (GBD) Project, WHO,
http://www.who.int/healthinfo/globalburden disease/about/en/ (last visited Sept. 18,
2016) [https://perma.cc/ZT7C-77LA] (archived Sept. 19, 2016) (discussing the global
burden of diseases).
126. Programme Budget 2014-2015, supra note 124.
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Amid the wave of dissatisfaction with the WHO from Member
States-manifested by the creation of rival institutions and the
restriction of the WHO's operational budget-the agency also suffers
from an identity crisis, which further diminishes stakeholders'
confidence in the organization. In response to the universal criticism
that the agency was ineffective in handling the Ebola outbreak,
Director-General Margaret Chan defended the organization, arguing
that the WHO is "a technical agency," with "governments having first
priority to take care of their people." 127 While it is true that the WHO
does not possess the necessary financial resources to undertake disease
surveillance and engage in day-to-day medical activities, it is equally
unreasonable to expect the worst-affected states with fragile public
health systems to be able to contain EVD without external assistance
(as suggested by Director-General Chan during the early response
phase). 128 Moreover, from a moral viewpoint, the WHO, as the global
public health agency, has a moral, if not legal, responsibility to provide
timely assistance to the populations worst affected by an outbreak. In
particular, the Director-General has the sole discretion to declare an
outbreak a PHEIC under the IHR, which MSF argues would have
triggered the international mechanisms necessary for mobilizing
resources to contain the spread of EVD. 129 Yet, it would take four and
half months after the first confirmed incidence of EVD for DirectorGeneral Chan to make the declaration on August 8, 2014. By then the
virus had spread to Nigeria, with infected health workers and
missionaries returning from West Africa to be hospitalized in their
130
respective home countries, including the United States and Spain.

127. Sheri Fink, WHO Leader Describes the Agency's Ebola Operations, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/04/world/africa/who-leader-describesthe-agencys-ebola -operations.html?_r-0 [https:/perma.cc/LWL2-7SCS] (archived Sept.
19, 2016).
128. Lena Sun, Brady Dennis, Lenny Bernstein & Joel Achenbach, How Ebola Sped
Out of Control,WASH. POST (Oct. 4, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
sf/national/2014/10/04/how-ebola-sped-out-of-control/ [https://perma.ec/27H5-AMZ7]
(archived Sept. 19, 2016).
129. Ebola: the Failuresof the InternationalOutbreak Response, MSF INT'L (Aug.
29, 2014), http://www.msf.org/article/ebola-failures-international-outbreak-response
[https://perma.cc/6V62-UBHD] (archived Sept. 19, 2016); Maria Cheng, UN: We Botched
Response
to
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Outbreak,
AP
NEWS
(Oct.
17,
2014),
http://www.bigstory.ap.org/article/6fd22fbcca0c47318cb178596d57dc7a/un-we-botchedresponse-ebola-outbreak [https://perma.cc/9YLD-WD9X] (archived Sept. 19, 2016).
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the
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CDC,
http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-africa/united-states-importedcase.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2016) [https://perma.cc/RWB9-5EQT] (archived Sept. 19,
2016); Ebola Outbreak: Nurse Infected in Spain, BBC NEWS (Oct. 6, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29514920
[https://perma.cc/DPX9-U628]
(archived Sept. 19, 2016) (discussing the timeline for Ebola cases in the United States);
Ebola Virus Disease - Spain, WHO DISEASE OUTBREAK NEWS (Oct. 9, 2014),
http://www.who.intcsr/don/09-october-2014-ebola/en/
[https://perma.cc/AG4P-8ZPT]
(archived Sept. 19, 2016).
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The WHO's hesitancy in declaring the 2014 Ebola outbreak a
PHEIC, in part, is reactionary to its HIN1 experience, where many
critics claimed that the WHO had made its PHEIC declaration
prematurely. 131 This experience made the agency extremely cautious
in declaring a situation a PHEIC; the WHO is now visibly reluctant to
do so unless an almost universal consensus exists. 132 Nonetheless, the
WHO's hesitance to lead meant that MSF-the only prominent
international humanitarian aid organization providing medical care
and support during the initial phase of the outbreak-was left to care
for infected patients in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone without
international logistical, human, or medical resources. 133 These
countries had just emerged from long periods of civil conflict, and the
deep distrust of authority and foreign workers made MSF's work more
134
difficult.
While the 2014 Ebola outbreak occupied center stage in the recent
WHA, this focus did not translate into an increased budget for the
WHO. 135 Nonetheless, in an attempt to restore the agency's credibility
and leadership, Director-General Chan announced the creation of a
Contingency Fund for Emergencies and medical corps reserve. 136 The
WHO estimates that the cost of the Ebola response, preparedness,

131. Dr. Margaret Chan, ExternalReview of WHO's Response to the HIN1 Influenza
Pandemic,WHO (Sept. 28, 2010), http://www.who.int/dg/speeches/2O1O/ihr-review_201
00928/en/ [https://perma.cc/TT3Z-BXZ7] (archived Sept. 29, 2016).
132. In contrast, WHO declared Zika virus a PHEIC on February 1, 2016, despite
that the casual link between the virus and microcephaly was yet then to be scientifically
established. In this context, it is reasonable to consider WHO's relatively prompt
declaration of Zika virus in Latin America as a political reaction to its widely criticized
response and leadership failure during the 2014 Ebola outbreak. Legal scholar Lawrence
Gostin further points out that WHO was right to sound the global alert on Zika virus,
but the agency still fell short in announcing an action plan and mobilizing the necessary
resources which should follow the declaration. Hence the agency's laudable attempt to
salvage its reputation contributed little to alleviant the situation on the ground. Donald
G. McNeil Jr., Proof of Zika's Role in Birth Defects Still Months Away, W.H.O. Says, N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
19,
2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02120/healthlzika-virusmicrocephaly-birth-defects-proof-who.html?_r-0
(subscription
required)
[https://perma.cc/5WXB-W2A6] (archived Sept. 29, 2016); Lawrence Gostin, The WHO
has not Done Enough, TIME (Feb. 2, 2016), http://time.com/4204079/who-zika/
[https://perma.cc/65V4-3ZHX] (archived Sept. 19, 2016).
133. Ebola, MSF USA, http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/our-work/medicalissues/ebola (last visited Sept. 16, 2016) [https://perma.cc/VLT5-9TUV] (archived Sept.
19, 2016).
134. Benton & Dionne, supranote 52, at 227-28.
135. See generally APPROVED PROGRAMME BUDGET 2014-15 BROKEN DOWN BY
PROGRAMME AREA WITH DETAILS ON: STAFFING AND ACTIVITIES, BY MAJOR OFFICE AND
ORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL,
WHO
(June 24, 2013), http://www.who.int/about/
resources-planning/PB2014_15 additional information byProgrammeArea.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U75R-6R59] (archived Sept. 19, 2016) (displaying the WHO budget).
136. About
WHO, WHO,
http://www.who.int/about/who-reform/emergencycapacities/en (last visited Sept. 16, 2016) [https://perma.cc/SKJ2-7N96] (archived Sept.
19, 2016).

VANDERBILTJOURNAL

OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 49:93.1

health systems rebuilding, and research and development is $350
million. 137 Yet, to date, a funding gap of $171 million (75 percent)
remains. 138 Another possible avenue for consolidating substantial
international commitment, the G7 Summit, also failed to achieve a
concrete commitment, despite the fact that previously the G7 has
delivered major public health initiatives-such as the Global Fund to
fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria in 2002, which forged global
health cooperation. 139
It is worth noting that, during the last two decades, global health
security has raised its political prominence in part due to the strategic
framings of international infectious disease control as a security as
well as a development issue. 140 In 2001, the WHA recognized that
"public health is a priority for development and that combating
communicable diseases ...provides important and immediate
opportunities for progress." 141 This development framing gained
considerable political recognition with the international community,
and has resulted in significant resource mobilization devoted to the
142
eradication of HIV/AIDS.
Similarly, in the realm of international control of infectious
diseases, the security framing has also gained considerable political
traction internationally. 143 The WHA emphasizes that "any upsurge in
cases of infectious disease in a given country is potentially of concern
for the international community." 144 This approach has helped connect
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[https://perma.cc/995B-CTF2]
(archived Sept. 19, 2016).
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story.asp?Newsld=49092#.Vlv-eb-2W3g [https://perma.cc/TA7H-D343] (archived Sept.
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Tuberculosis and Malaria, GOVERNMENT OFFICES SWEDEN, MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN
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2016).
140. Gavin Yamey, Sabine Campe & Sara Fewer, Germany, The G7, and Global
Health, 350 B.M.J. 1210 (2015).
141. World Health Assembly, Global Health Security: Epidemic Alert and
Response, U.N. Dec. WHA54.14 (May 21, 2001).
142. See, e.g., Who We Are, USAID, https://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are (last visited
Sept. 16, 2016) [https://perma.cc/7TFD-MANS] (archived Sept. 19, 2016) (discussing how
USAID carries out U.S. foreign policy to help eradicate HIV/AIDS).
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[https://perma.cc/HZ9U-2FYF] (archived Sept. 19, 2016) (explaining how World Health
Assembly has responded to changes throughout the years).
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global health with the core political interests of states, transformed the
WHO from a technical medical organization into a more politicalized
14 5
organization, and, importantly, catalyzed the revision of the IHR.
However, legal scholar David P. Fidler warns that the 2014 Ebola
outbreak has critically damaged the political, institutional, and legal
pillars of this approach in elevating global health in the international
political agenda. 146 In Fidler's view, both the WHO and its Member
States are responsible for undermining this strategy for global health
security. 147 Specifically, Fidler argues that the WHO's rejection of the
Review Committee's recommendation on the WHO's performance in
the SARS outbreak, and its decision to cut funding and reduce staff
from its surveillance team, significantly undermined its own authority
in global health security.148 While it is true that the WHO's strategic
choice to downplay global health security was, in hindsight, shortsighted, it is also worth emphasizing again that the WHO remains
fundamentally a member-driven organization, meaning that the WHO
often does not possess the necessary institutional autonomy to make
bold political decisions: historically, the WHO has experienced
considerable financial cutbacks after making bold decisions that were
averse to the interests of strong Member States. This suggests a
pressing need to empower the WHO institutionally.
This Article now turns to the IHR-the international legal
architecture for infectious disease control-which grounds the
discussion on linking the IHR with the PEF, the focus of Part IV.
C. The InternationalHealth Regulations
The current infectious disease regime builds from a series of
international sanitary conventions and agreements dating from
1851.149 Beginning in 1948, the WHO initiated a series of revisions and
consolidated these agreements into WHO Regulation No. 2-the
International Sanitary Regulations (1951 Regulations)-which was
later adopted by the Fourth WHA in 1951. The 1951 Regulations
underwent a number of revisions as knowledge and control of
epidemics evolved. 150 The 1951 Regulations were renamed the
"International Health Regulations" in 1969, and focused specifically on

145. See Strengthening Health Security by Implementing the InternationalHealth
Regulations (2005), WHO, http://www.who.int/ihr/en/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/L46R-GMRL] (archived Sept. 19, 2016) (discussing why IHR(2005) was
adopted and providing a link to what was enacted).
146. David L. Heymann et al., Global Health Security: The Wider Lessons from the
West African Ebola Virus Disease Epidemic, 385 THE LANCET 1884, 1888 (2015).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Bruemmer & Taylor, supra note 87, at 278.
150. Id.
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three infectious diseases: cholera, plague, and yellow fever. 151 Over
time, it became apparent that the IHR was ill-equipped to handle the
growing complexity in global health security, which had been
accelerated by the increased flow of international travel and trade.
Among the shortcomings of the 1969 IHR were its lack of human rights
considerations, the scarcity of mechanisms through which the WHO
could collaborate with affected countries in identifying the sources of
outbreak, and the lack of legal framework for the WHO to make disease
control recommendations. 152
In 1995, in the wake of plague and EVD in the Democratic
Republic of Congo, the WHA passed a resolution to revise and update
the IHR. However, it was not until 2003, with the emergence of the
SARS epidemic in China, that the revision of IHR began in earnest. 153
Two years later, on May 23, 2005, the WHA adopted the substantively
revised IHR (2005 IHR), which entered into force on June 15, 2007.154
The key purpose of the 2005 IHR is "to prevent, protect against,
control and provide a public health response to the international
spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with and restricted
to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference with
international traffic and trade." 155 The 2005 IHR recognizes that a
global health emergency necessitates an international coordinated
response. Significantly, the WHA adopted the IHR under Article 21 of
the WHO Constitution, meaning that all Member States are bound by
the IHR unless they expressly announced a reservation to them. The
binding nature of Article 21 is unique among international institutions
with international lawmaking authority. 156 The 2005 IHR provides a
global legal architecture for coordinated and proportionate responses
to significant emerging disease threats to global health security.
Importantly, the 2005 IHR reaffirms the importance of prevention-a
core public health value-and embeds the public health norms into the
international health regime. Equally important, the 2005 IHR
establishes the WHO as the directing and coordinating authority on

151. Id.
152. Id. at 278-79.
153. David P. Fidler, From International Sanitary Conventions to Global Health
Security: The New InternationalHealth Regulations, 4 CHINESE J. INT'L. L. 325, 343
(2005).
154. WHO, supranote 145.
155. WHO,
INTERNATIONAL
HEALTH
REGULATIONS
(2d
ed.
2005),
http://apps.who.intiris/bitstream/10665/43883/1/9789241580410_eng.pdf
(last visited
Sept. 18, 2016) [https://perma.cc/DKB4-DNEP] (archived Sept. 19, 2016) [hereinafter
IHR(2005)] (discussing why IHR(2005) was adopted and providing a link to what was
enacted);

see

also

INTERNATIONAL

HEALTH

REGULATIONS

(1969),

WHO,

http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/I0665/96616/1/9241580070.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YDL8-S62W] (archived Sept. 19, 2016) (amended in 1973 and 1981).
156. CONST. OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, supra note 67, at art. 21.
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international health within the UN system and recognizes health as a
57
human right. 1
The WHA adopted the 2005 IHR with three key updates. First,
instead of limiting it to specific diseases, the 2005 IHR expands the
scope of coverage. Under the new IHR, countries are required to notify
the WHO of "events that may constitute a public health emergency of
international concern."' 158 Annex 2 of the IHR provides an algorithm
for the concerned State Party to assess whether an event may
constitute an international public health emergency and procedures for
notifying the WHO accordingly. 159 The algorithm includes a risk
assessment of public health impact, the risk to human health, the risk
of international spread of disease, and the risk of interference with
160
international traffic.
Second, the 2005 IHR encourages non-state actors to submit
outbreak reports. Article 9 permits the WHO to consider such reports
in accordance with established scientific principles and disclose the
information to the relevant State Party, although the WHO may retain
the confidentiality of the source if it is duly justified. 161 Third, in
determining whether an event constitutes an international public
health risk, Article 12 provides that the Director-General of the WHO,
in consultation with the State Party concerned, shall make the primary
determination of a health emergency of international concern. 162
Article 12 further provides a list of criteria the Director-General shall
consider in the initial assessment: information provided by the State
Party, the advice of the Emergency Committee, scientific principles,
and assessments of the risk to human health, the risk of international
spread of disease, and the risk of interference with international
traffic. The 2005 IHR requires the Director-General to convene a
special IHR Emergency Committee to recommend appropriate
16 3
temporary measures.
The 2009 HiN1 pandemic Influenza A marked the first major test
of the 2005 IHR, which has since seen an improvement in transparency
in the WHO's PHEIC decision-making. 164 Based on the
recommendation of the WHO Review Committee on the Functioning of
the 2015 International Health Regulations in relation to the 2009

157. Andrai Zidar, WHO International Health Regulations and Human Rights:
From Allusions to Inclusion, 19 INT'L J. HUM. RTS. 505, 505-26 (2015).

158. IHR(2005), supranote 155, at 1.
159. Id. at annex 2.
160. Id.
161. Id. at art. 9.
162. Id. at art. 12.
163. Id. at art. 48-49.
164. See, e.g., WHO, Pandemic Influenza Risk Management WHO Interim
Guidance, U.N.Doc. WHO/HSE/HEA/HSP/2013.3 (2013) (discussing the lessons learned
from HINi 2009 pandemic).

962

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 49:931

HIN1 pandemic, which was adopted by the WHO's Member States at
the sixty-fourth WHA, the WHO has since disclosed the identity and
relevant background in its subsequent appointments of an Emergency
165
Committee.
The 2014 Ebola outbreak again tested the IHR, and the widely
recognized WHO leadership failure might provide the necessary
political momentum to remedy the structural weaknesses of the IHR.
There are three notable structural shortcomings related to the WHO,
the global health regime, and the IHR, respectively.
First, the WHO has dual, and sometimes competing, missions: the
organization acts both as a moral voice for global health as well as an
agent for Member States. 166 This potential conflict of interest of the
WHO has rendered much of the organization dysfunctional,
particularly in instances when the WHO's moral aspirations are at
odds with Member States' interests. Member States dissatisfied with
the WHO can refuse to cooperate with the organization or express their
discontent through budget cuts. 167 As a member-driven organization,
the WHO's scientific and technical aspirations for global health remain
conditioned by the approvals, needs, and preferences of its Member
States, which often do not align with global disease burdens. 168 Since
2011, the WHO's budget has been cut by a half-billion dollars, resulting
in a loss of three hundred WHO headquarter jobs, where its emergency
unit lost nearly two-thirds of its staff, and the Regional Office for Africa
lost nine out of twelve emergency staff members. 169
Moreover, of the WHO's 2014-2015 budget of $3.997 billion, only
23 percent ($930 million) came from mandatory dues, with the
remaining 77 percent coming from voluntary contributions, which are
typically earmarked for specific projects. 170 As a consequence of the
funding allocation, the WHO 2014-2015 budget devoted less than $4

165. List of Members of, and Advisers to, the International Health Regulations
(2005) Emergency Committee regardingEbola, WHO, http://www.who.int/ihr/
procedures/emerg-comm members_20140806/en!
(last visited
Oct. 15,
2016)
[https://perma.cc/4XBW-RH4L] (archived Oct. 15, 2016).
166. Lawrence 0. Gostin & Madison Powers, What Does Social Justice Require for
the Public's Health? PublicHealth Ethics and Policy Imperatives, 25 HEALTH AFF. 1053,
1054 (2006).

167. See, e.g., Special Issue: WHO Past, Present and Future, 128 PUB. HEALTH 115,
195-99 (2014) (discussing cooperation among states and the threat of budget cuts).
168. See, e.g., Programme Budget 2014-2015, supranote 124.
169. Additionally, the WHO has a three-tier structure: each country reports to a
regional office where the head of the regional office is elected directly and funded
partially by the countries in the region. The WHO Afro regional office therefore is
dependent on Africa's ministers of health, instead of possessing full governance
autonomy. Sarach Boseley, Ebola is All But Over, But the Postmortem is Just Getting
Started, GUARDIAN (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/30/
ebola-inquest-un-united-nations-world-health-organisation [https://perma.cc/L2LV6AST] (archived Sept. 19, 2016).
170. Programme Budget 2014-2015, supra note 124.
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billion to epidemic preparedness, evidently incommensurate with its
worldwide responsibility. 1 71 Although in recent years the number of
voluntary contributions has increased considerably, the WHO
estimates that, in order for the organization to function at its intended
capacity, mandatory contribution must exceed more than 30 percent of
its total budget. 172 This is because, unlike voluntary contribution,
mandatory dues are a reliable funding source and afford the WHO the
flexibility to respond rapidly to unforeseen events such as the Ebola
outbreak. Accordingly, the WHO proposed a 5 percent increase in its
mandatory contribution at the recent WHA, but it was rejected,
meaning that the WHO will operate within the same budget it has had
for the past eight years. 1 73 As a side note, it is also worth pointing out
that, during the 2014 Ebola outbreak, the WHO was also consulted
about the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus. 174 These
concurrent demands on the WHO spread the already scarce human
resources even thinner. It is therefore unrealistic to expect the WHO
to be able to fulfill its constitutional mandate because it does not have
sufficient financial resources. In the face of resource and financial
constraints, the WHO must have a clear vision of its role in global
health: for example, providing technical assistance, supporting
ground-level response, or setting global norms.
Second, disparity exists across countries' core capability in
containing infectious diseases. Articles 5 and 13 require State Parties
to develop minimal "core public health capacities" by 2012, with a
possibility of extension until 2016.175 However, as of 2011, only a third
of State Parties to the IHR (74 out of 194 countries) had developed

171. Lawrence 0. Gostin & Eric A. Friedman, A Retrospective and Prospective
Analysis of the West African Ebola Virus Disease Epidemic: Robust National Health
Systems at the Foundationand an Empowered WHO at the Apex, 385 THE LANCET 1902,
1904 (2015).
172. WHO, Proposed Programme Budget 2014-2015, U.N. Doc. A66/7, at 2 (Apr. 19,
2013), http://www.who.int/about/resources-planning/A66_7-en.pdf
[https://perma.ccIY7PV-8Q9F] (archived Sept. 19, 2016). In fact, the Ebola Interim
Assessment Panel suggests that Member States should reconsider increasing assessed
contribution by 5 percent from the policy of zero nominal growth at the 2016 Executive
Board and World Health Assembly meetings. REPORT OF THE EBOLA INTERIM
ASSESSMENT

PANEL,

WHO,

7,

http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/ebola/

ebola-panel-report/en/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2016) [https://perma.c/WMM4-B4JV]
(archived Sept. 19, 2016).
173. See WHO, Draft Proposed Programme Budget 2016-2017, U.N. Doc. EB136/34
(Jan.
16,
2015),
http://www.who.int/about/resources-planning/EB136_34-en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GG8C-R4F6] (archived Sept. 19, 2016) (displaying the proposed
budget).
174. Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CV), WHO,
http://www.who.int/emergencies/mers-cov/en/
(last visited
Sept.
17,
2016)
[https://perma.cc/C25B-JMJUI (archived Sept. 29, 2016).
175. IHR(2005), supra note 155.
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national plans to meet core capacity requirements. 176 An independent
Review Committee warned presciently, after reviewing the WHO's
performance in the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic, that "the world is
ill-prepared to respond... to a global, sustained and threatening
public health emergency." 177 Despite the Review Committee's
warning, the WHO did not adopt the Committee's recommendations,
even though concerns about global health security features
prominently in the WHO's governance reform, which began in 2010.
The full implementation of the IHR, the Review Committee urged, is
central in securing the shared goal of global health security. 178 While
the IHR has limited enforcement mechanisms, the Review Committee
pointed out that, within WHO's mandate, the organization could
mobilize appropriate agencies and organizations to help provide
technical assistance to interested countries and make a business case
for investment. 179 However, in part because of the WHO's fiscal
difficulties, the WHA rejected the Review Committee's proposals for
strengthening the IHR. 180 Instead, the WHO turned its attention to
more politically palatable problems such as universal healthcare and
non-communicable diseases. 181 The WHO's strategic choice to

176. See Accelerating Implementation of the International Health Regulations
(2005), WHO (2013), http://www.who.int/ihr/publications/WHOHSEGCR_20135en.pdf.ua=l (last visited Sept. 18, 2016) [https://perma.cc/J2KF-MXX2] (archived Sept.
19, 2016) (stating that more than half of State Parties have requested extensions).
177. WHO, Report of the Review Committee on the Functioning of the International
Health Regulations (2005) in Relation to Pandemic (H1N1) 2009, U.N. Doc. 18 A64/10
(May 5, 2011), http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf files/WHA641A64_10-en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EHU5-6C6Y] (archived Sept. 19, 2016).
178. Id. ("The world is ill-prepared to respond to a severe influenza pandemic or to
any similarly global, sustained and threatening public-health emergency. Beyond
implementation of core public-health capacities called for in the IHR, global
preparedness can be advanced through research, reliance on a multisectoral approach,
strengthened health-care delivery systems, economic development in low and middleincome countries and improved health status.")
179. Id. at 26. ("WHO and States Parties should refine and update their strategies
for implementing the capacity-building requirements of the IHR, focusing first on those
countries that will have difficulty meeting the 2012 deadline for core capacities. One
possible way to support and accelerate implementation would be for WHO to mobilize
appropriate agencies and organizations that would be willing to provide technical
assistance to help interested countries assess their needs and make the business case for
investment. Making the case for investment in IHR capacity building and subsequent
resource mobilization would increase the likelihood that more States Parties could come
into compliance with the IHR. Donor countries and organizations could take advantage
of the IHR Annex 1A as a priority list for development support and also seize
opportunities to share specialized resources, such as laboratories, across countries. WHO
should also update the 2007 guidance on NFP functions, and include examples of good
practice to reinforce the value of the IHR.").
180. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
181. See WHO, MONITORING OF THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE HEALTH-RELATED
MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS, REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT 15 (May, 21, 2010),
http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf-filesfWHA63/A63_R15-en.pdf
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downplay the importance of global health security is partly intertwined
with its survival strategy in a crowded global health landscape and
partly relates to the WHO's timidity in voicing its concerns with public
health issues that are inherently political. A considerable body of
literature discusses ways in which a country's core capability can be
improved, which is relevant to the discussion, but beyond the scope of
this Article.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the IHR lacks enforcement
mechanisms. The absence of IHR enforcement mechanisms
fundamentally undermines the overall effectiveness of the IHR.
Arguably, routine violations of the IHR occur principally because
noncompliance does not result in legal sanctions and states often do
not incur high political costs for their noncompliance. This is not,
however, to overlook the variety of circumstances and factors-lack of
health capacities, poverty, and fear of severe economic, political, and
social repercussions from notifying the WHO-underpinning the
widespread noncompliance. In the aggregate, noncompliance
undermines the overall effectiveness of the IHR and puts global health
security at risk.
In the absence of enforceable legal sanctions, states have little
incentive to comply with the IHR. One of the most noticeable, and often
deliberate violations concerns the implementation of precautionary
cross-border
control
measures
that
exceed
the
WHO's
recommendation. While the IHR permits a sovereign state to
implement
additional
measures
beyond
the
temporary
recommendation issued by the WHO, Article 43 requires the concerned
State Party to disclose its public health rationales and relevant
scientific information to the WHO within three months after the
implementation.' 8 2 In theory, this disclosure provision should function
as a disincentive, deterring State Parties from taking measures that
would significantly interfere with international travel and traffic. In
addition, the provision ensures that health and aid workers can travel
to the affected countries without unnecessary travel restrictions and
prevents stigmatization of the affected countries.
In practice, the WHO has little power to compel Member States to
voluntarily disclose the information that prompted them to implement
additional measures in the first place. While it is true that the WHO
can publicly shame the violating states, this has proven to be of limited
impact. During the 2014 Ebola outbreak, for instance, more than forty
countries implemented additional measures without providing
scientific justification to the WHO.' 8 3 In addition to the stigmatization

[https://perma.cc/BG5U-R6NQ] (archived Sept. 19, 2016) (evaluating the Millennium
Development Goals set forth by the WHO).
182. IHR(2005), supranote 155, at art. 43.
183. Infra note 186.
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faced by affected countries, excessive, and often unjustified measures
can also impede international travel and delay international response
significantly: a travel ban prevented affected African countries from
receiving necessary personnel and supplies during the peak of the
Ebola outbreak. 184 Canada and Australia, for instance, imposed a near
blanket travel restriction on entry for residents from Ebola's West
African epicenter against the WHO's recommendation, which put
additional pressure on the worst-affected countries already crippled by
the outbreak.1 8 5 The WHO has since called for Canada and Australia
to disclose their public health rationales as provided in the IHR, but
both countries have yet to comply.186
One common way to understand State Parties' deliberate violation
of the IHR is through a cost-benefit analysis, which is frequently used
as a framework by political scientists to understand state behavior,
particularly by those belonging to the rationalist school. Briefly,
rationalists argue that states weigh the costs of noncompliance against
the benefits of compliance. Such a rationalistic calculation means that
states will put their self-interest first, above all else. Eminent jurist
Louis Henkin famously observed that "nations will comply with
international law only if it is in their interest to do so; they will
disregard law or obligation if the advantages of violation outweigh the
advantages of observance."1 87 Thus, in the context of international
infectious diseases control, a state that takes an excessive protective
measure may boost its domestic confidence because the government is
seen as protecting the public's health and welfare-political capital
highly treasured by state governments; however, the WHO's public
denouncement of the government's excessive, and often arbitrary,
measure tends to have little, if any, political cost for the violating state.
The benefits of noncompliance therefore outweigh the benefits of
compliance, and explain why many states routinely violate the IHR.
Arguably, without enforceable legal sanctions, states will likely

184. See generally, supra note 78 and accompanying text.
185. See Australia Suspends Visas, supra note 78; Ebola outbreak: Sierra Leone
angry at Australia visa ban, BBC NEWS (Oct. 28, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/worldafrica-29809863 [https://perma.cc/GD6L-C95J] (archived Sept. 19, 2016); Euan McKirdy,
Australia Instigates Ebola-Prompted Ban On Travel From West Africa, CNN (Oct. 28,
2014), http://edition.cnn.com/2014/10/28/world/asia/australia-immigration-policy-ebola/
[https://perma.cc/GN4Y-3YYC] (archived Sept. 19, 2016); Response to Ebola, HEALTHY
CANADIANS, http://healthycanadians.gc.ca/
diseases-conditions-maladies-affections/disease-maadie/ebola/responserepnse/indexeng.php (last visited Sept. 18, 2016) [https://perma.cc/G4FM-GYB4] (archived Sept. 19,

2016).
186. Australia Must Explain Ebola Visa Ban: WHO, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD
(Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.smh.com.au/world/australia-must-explain-ebola-visa-banwho-20141105-11hkdj.html [https://perma.cc/EAA8-KJKM] (archived Sept. 19, 2016).
187. Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 49 (2d ed.
1979).
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continue to violate the IHR. It should also be noted that the calculation
of national interests is highly complex, and rarely a straightforward
process.
Admittedly, not all IHR noncompliance occurs as a product of
states' careful political calculus. Under the IHR, State Parties are
required to report their IHR implementation progress, but the
reporting requirement is widely ignored, notably by Guinea, Liberia,
and Sierra Leone.18 8 Lack of health capacity largely explains the weak
compliance rate among these countries, where their fragile public
health infrastructures are the result of decades of civil wars, structural
adjustment politics, and postwar foreign aids. 189 In fact, Guinea,
Liberia, and Sierra Leone cited the lack of health capacities as the key
reason for their IHR noncompliance. Part IV takes up this discussion
again, arguing that, in crafting the varying types of incentives and
their corresponding legal consequences, a distinction must be made
between a state's willingness versus a state's capability to comply with
the IHR. The former should result in material legal consequences
whereas the latter should not.
The recent devastation in West Africa has also resulted in a surge
of financial pledging from countries and multilateral agencies for postEbola recovery. The Obama administration, for instance, announced a
$5.4 billion fund to combat Ebola in West Africa. 190 As of May 2015,
World Bank Group has mobilized $1.62 billion for financing post-Ebola
recovery efforts in the countries most affected by Ebola. 19 1 Likewise,
the WHO announced at the WHA the creation of a $228 million
contingency fund, aimed at financing its newly established health
emergency program. 192 However, serious doubts remain as to the
sustainability of these efforts. Indeed, Dr. Bruce Aylward, the WHO
Assistant Director-General in charge of the Ebola operational
response, warned that the biggest challenge to EVD eradication is not
complacency among the countries, but rather the funding gap.193 Dr.

188. WHO, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (2005)
Annex (Apr. 5, 2013), http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf-files/WHA66/A6616-en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GFU3-JNB7] (archived Sept. 18, 2016) (showing that Guinea, Liberia
and Sierra Leone have not reported their IHR implementation progress).
189. Benton & Dionne, supra note 52.
190. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
191. See Press Release, World Bank, Ebola: Most African Countries Avoid Major
Economic Loss but Impact on Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone Remains Crippling (Jan. 20,
2015) (http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2015/O1/20/ebola-most-africancountries-avoid-major-economic -loss-but-impact-on-guinea-liberia-sierra-leoneremains-crippling [https://perma.cc/RWE3-PW3S] (archived Sept. 19, 2016)) (stating as
of January 2015 the World Bank Group had mobilized $1 billion).
192. Grieshaber, supra note 2.
193. Stepanie Nebehay, Ebola set to persist in 2015, but funds for aid are lacking:
WHO, REUTERS (May 26, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/26/us-healthwho-idUSKBNOOB1VG20150526 [https://perma.cc/W8SA-4G42] (archived Sept. 19,
2016).
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Aylward's concern is not without grounds; the WHO's contingency fund
will be financed by flexible, voluntary contributions, most likely to be
formalized as public-private partnerships. 194 In other realms of
international voluntary financing, such as climate change, sustainable
funding also remains a persistent issue. 195 In addition to the
unpredictability of funding sources, a real danger exists as the WHO
has to compete for funds when the world turns its attention to other,
equally important global commitments-for instance, climate change
or the Sustainable Development Goals-in a financially parsimonious
world.
The remainder of this Article focuses on two fundamental
weaknesses of the international infectious disease regime, namely, the
weak, or almost non-existent, financing and enforcement mechanisms.
This brings an additional insight to the widely discussed WHO
governance reform, which is commonly seen as a remedy to the
dysfunctional international infectious disease control regime. 196 While
it is true that WHO governance reform is much needed, it is also
important to look for ways to enhance and foster cooperation in the
international infectious disease regime. Accordingly, the Article draws
attention to the possible informal institutional linkage between the
WHO and the World Bank as a source for building a synergistic
relationship between these two organizations. Specifically, it focuses
on strengthening the effectiveness of the IHR vis-&-vis informal
linkage with the PEF, where the financial clout of the World Bank
would give the WHO quasi-enforcement power over IHR
noncompliance.
As stated above, states will only cooperate if such cooperation
furthers their self-interests, according to the rationalist. 197 The
rationalist viewpoint may help explain why the 2005 IHR lacks real,
actually enforceable mechanisms by design. In an instance of dispute
over a treaty application, for example, the IHR favors a conciliatory
approach. Article 56 provides that "[i]n the event of a dispute between
two or more States Parties concerning the interpretation or application
of these Regulations, the States Parties concerned shall seek ... to
settle the dispute through negotiation or any other peaceful

194. Jim Yong Kim, We Need A New Global Response to Pandemics, WORLD ECON.
FORUM (Jan. 20, 2015), https://agenda.weforum.org/2015/01/we-need-a-new-globalresponse-to-pandemics/ [https://perma.cc/VU9N-F5P2] (archived Sept. 19, 2016).
195. See generally Katrina Miriam Wyman, Responses to Climate Migration, 37
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 167 (2013) (discussing funding gaps in climate change funding).
196. See e.g., Lawrence Gostin, Carmen C. Mundaca-Shah & Patrick W. Kelley,
Neglected Dimensions of Global Security, The Global Health Risk Framework
Commission, 315 JAMA 1451 (2016); Lawrence Gostin, Reforming The World Health
OrganizationAfter Ebola, 313 JAMA 1407 (2015) (discussing reforming WHO's regional
structure).
197. JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
29-32 (2005).
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means .
."198 To date, no dispute between State Parties has been
documented. While coordination in international infectious disease
control is highly desirable, even necessary, sovereign states remain
reluctant to agree to enforceable legal obligations. Nonetheless, states
need a regime that requires minimal international cooperation and
ensures predictability in disease response, particularly when the
uncontrolled international spread of infectious diseases can threaten
an individual state's national security. The binding nature of the IHR
affords its signatories some general levels of predictability without
specific obligations. For instance, the IHR institutionalizes the practice
of information sharing, which is critical in international infectious
disease surveillance. The participating states, at least in theory, are
collectively better off than they would be in the absence of the IHR
because they have access to information that otherwise would be
difficult to obtain.
Yet the IHR's lack of enforceable obligations hinders the global
progress of international health security in two important and related
ways. First, the IHR relies on State Parties to self-report on their
implementation progress regarding disease surveillance, diagnosis,
and core capability. 199 No external funding is available to assist failed
or failing states in implementing their core IHR requirements: Absent
this financial assistance, the situations in failed or failing states will
remain unchanged, if not worsen. Moreover, since there is no external
verification of a country's implementation progress, self-reporting is
the only official source for assessing IHR implementation progress
worldwide. This IHR implementation gap puts global health security
in significant jeopardy.
Second, and relatedly, while the WHO Constitution provides that,
upon request, the WHO should assist governments in strengthening
their health services and facilitate the UN's provision of health
services, in practice, failed states often require more than technical
assistance; they typically have non-functioning public health systems.
The 2014 Ebola outbreak again demonstrated the urgency of
remedying the decimated public health systems found in failed or
failing states, principally through sustained international financing.
Poor public health systems put international health security at risk;
the global defense against contagions is only as strong as its weakest
link. Although, since the peak of the Ebola outbreak, countries and
multilateral agencies have pledged financial commitments to support
West Africa, the devil is in the details; namely, these efforts remain
voluntary, meaning that they are not enforceable obligations. States
have welcomed the WHO's proposal of the emergency medical reserve
at the WHA, and the initiative was promoted by Chancellor Merkel at

198. IHR(2005), supra note 155, at art. 56.
199. Id. at art. 43.
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the G7 meeting in Germany, but no concrete measures were decided by
20 0
the end of the summit.
III. INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE OF HEALTH

Instead of analyzing the 2014 Ebola outbreak as partly a function
of the WHO's institutional and governance failures, the Article now
broadens the discussion and situates the debate in the context of the
global governance for health. Admittedly, confluences of historical
factors--civil wars, colonialism, and slave trade-have lingering
effects on the fragile health systems found in West Africa. Since the
Article is interested in promoting international cooperation in the
realm of the global health security vis-t-vis international
organizations, this Part focuses the International Financial
Institution's (IFI) structural adjustment policies (SAPs) in particular,
and foreign aid in general. In so doing, this Part highlights the need to
embed public health norms in an international system and the need to
re-establish the WHO's leadership in the realm of global health. The
discussion here does not, by any means, suggest that past IFI practices
are indicative of its future role in global health. Rather, the discussion
here highlights that economic development remains the primary goal
that guides the IFI's development projects, which, at times, can be in
conflict with public health. The discussion also underscores a
normative need for the WHO to voice moral concerns on behalf of the
world's most vulnerable populations, as mandated in its Constitution.
The involvement of the IFI in failed or failing states' health
systems is well documented. 20 1 The World Bank's poverty alleviation
mission often overlaps with the WHO's public health mandate. The
World Bank's involvement in the economic and social developments in
countries receiving support often has concomitant effects on the

200. DECLARATION OF THE G7 HEALTH MINISTERS 3 (Oct. 8-9, 2015),
http://www.bmg.bund.de/fileadmin/dateien/Downloads/G/G7Ges.Minister 2015/G7 HealthMinistersDeclarationAMR and EBOLA.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZP44-QK6U] (archived Sept. 19, 2016).
201. See generally Mohammed Nuruzzaman, The World Bank, Health Policy
Reforms and the Poor, 37 J. CONTEMP. ASIA 59 (2007) (arguing that health reforms
promoting private healthcare have had a severe negative impact on developing
countries); Benjamin Mason Meier & Larisa M. Mori, The Highest Attainable Standard:
Advancing a Collective HumanRight to PublicHealth, 37 COLUM. Hum. RTS. L. REV. 101
(2005) (discussing how globalization has created underlying detriments to health care);
Antony Anghie, Time Present and the Time Past: Globalization,InternationalFinancial
Institutes, and the Third World, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 243 (2000) (discussing the
role of IFIs in promoting globalization); Daniel D. Bradlow, Social Justice and
Development: CriticalIssues Facingthe Bretton Woods System: the World Bank, the IMF,
and Human Rights, 6 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47 (1996) (discussing IFIs
impact on human rights).
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population's health. 202 Beginning in the 1990s, the World Bank's
involvement in health projects also increased substantively, as it was
increasingly recognized that health is integral to an individual's and a
country's economic productivity. Yet the IFI's policy prescriptions for
improving health and wellbeing in the recipient country remain
grounded in neoliberalism: competitive markets are viewed as a crucial
component of a functional healthcare system. 20 3 Many scholars and
practitioners thus credited the World Bank's neoliberal agenda as a
key contributor underlying the fragile health systems found in West
Africa. 204 Despite the IFI's historical role in failed states' health
systems, some scholars remain optimistic about the potential role of
the IFI in shaping global health. Political philosopher Jennifer Prah
Ruger, for instance, argues that the World Bank, with its enviable
financial clout, can help establish good governance in health sectors at
20 5
the country level.
From a development perspective, good health is essential for
economic productivity. 20 6 Prompted in part by the escalating health
care costs globally, the World Bank began to incorporate health into its
development paradigm beginning in the 1990s. The 1993 World
Development Report, Investing in Health, helped inaugurate a marketbased view of health systems. 207 The World Development Report
identifies four key underlying factors that explain the rising health
care cost worldwide: misallocation of funds to less cost-effective
intervention, inappropriate deployment of medical staff and resources,
inequity in access to basic health care, and the disproportionate cost of
healthcare compared to income growth. 20 8 The World Bank's policy
prescription focused chiefly on improving health indicators through a
three-pronged approach: educating girls and empowering women,

202. Robin Stott, The World Bank: Friend Or Foe To The Poor?, 318 BRIT. MED. J.
822, 822-23 (1999).
203.

WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1993: INVESTING IN HEALTH 14,

http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/10.1596/0-1952-0890-0 (last visited Oct. 15, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/4HN7-E29R] (archived Oct. 15, 2016).
204. See id. (describing the neoliberal agenda); see also Margaux J. Hall, Aziza
Ahmed & Stephanie E. Swanson, Answering the Millennium Call for the Right to
Maternal Health: the Need to Eliminate User Fees, 12 YALE H.R. & DEV. L.J. 62
(discussing how user fees which are part of the neoliberal agenda have failed); Benjamin
Mason Meier, Employing Health Rights For Global Justice: The Promise Of Public
Health In Response To The InsalubriousRamifications of Globalization, 39 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 711, 718 (describing SAPs on developing countries' public health infrastructure
generally).
205. Jennifer Prah Ruger, The Changing Role of the World Bank in Global Health,
95 Am. J. PUB. HEALTH 60, 66-68 (2005).
206. Amartya Sen, Why Health Equity?, 11 HEALTH ECON. 659, 659 (2002) (Sen
argues that "health equity cannot but be a central feature of the justice of social
arrangements in general").
207. WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1993: INVESTING IN HEALTH, supra note 203.
208. Id. at 3-5, 52-71.
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focusing on cost-effective public health services, and, most
controversially, promoting "greater diversity and competition in the
financing and delivering of health services." 209 The 1993 World
Development Report soon became the blueprint for the World Bank's
health projects. Unlike the WHO, the World Bank enjoyed considerable
financial leverage from its lending practices with recipients, and it
extended the World Bank's reach beyond the economic sphere. Some
scholars go further and argue that the World Bank, with its enviable
financial clout, has replaced the WHO as the lead agency in health,
2 10
sidelining the WHO to technical support in health matters.
It is worth noting that while, in general, health outcomes (such as
life expectancy and infant mortality rates in developing countries) have
improved considerably since the World Bank's involvement in the
health sector, the extent to which the improved health outcomes can
be attributed to the World Bank's projects remains highly disputed: the
World Bank in fact conceded that it is difficult to gauge the success of
its advice and investment programs in improving health outcomes
because of the difficulties in qualifying it. 211 A considerable body of
literature suggests that the World Bank's involvement in health and
economic projects in Africa contributed to the diminishing role of the
state as the primary provider of healthcare and other basic social
welfare. The waning role of the state in the realm of welfare provision
in part explained the slow containment of the 2014 Ebola outbreak.
Opponents of the IFI's neoliberal agenda have long warned that the
market-oriented policies are often ill-equipped to accommodate social
212
welfare concerns.
Notably, much of the 1993 World Development Report's policy
recommendation echoes the World Bank's now famous study of SubSaharan Africa, published in 1981 (the "Berg Report"). This report cites
the inefficient use of government resources as a key cause of the poor
economic performance in Africa. 213 In broad strokes, the Berg Report
recommends reducing public expenditure on social welfare to remedy

209. Id. at iii.
210. See Thomas E. Novotny, Global Governance and Public Health Security in the
21st Century, 38 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 19, 25 (2007); Charles Clift, The Role Of The World
Health OrganizationIn The InternationalSystem 11 (Centre on Global Health Security
Working Group Papers No. 1, 2013), https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chatham
house/public/Research/Global%/20Health!0213_who.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2LCV-UCTL]
(archived Sept. 19, 2016) (discussing how the World Bank has challenged the WHO's
authority).
211. Stott, supra note 202.
212. Meier & Mori, supra note 201; see also, Solomon R. Benatar, Stephen Gill &
Isabella Bakker, Making Progressin Global Health: The Need for New Paradigms. 85
INT'L. AFF. 347, 355 (2009).
213. THE WORLD BANK, ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: AN
AGENDA FOR ACTION (1981), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/702471468768

312009/pdf'multi-page.pdf [https://perma.ccVX7D-VDUG] (archived Sept. 19, 2016).
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poor economic performance in Africa, and the IFI embraced the
neoliberal ideology that underlies the Berg Report wholeheartedly: IFI
loans were conditioned on commitments of its recipients to marketbased reform. 2 1 4 This loaning practice was grounded in an unyielding
faith in the market, which was perceived as an effective engine for

coordinating individual needs and societal interests, in keeping with
the IFI's neoliberal development paradigm.215
Consequently, the IFI's lending practices have resulted in
diminishing healthcare spending in

recipient states-as

recipient

states embraced neoliberal economic policies, hospitals and healthcare
job opportunities became fewer, and healthcare quality and the
qualified healthcare workforce also decreased considerably. 216 The
dramatic reduction in social welfare spending has reversed much of the
health progress achieved in recipient countries over the last five
decades. 217 A waning healthcare infrastructure also has spillover
health and security implications because it creates a gap in global

health security.

218

Incidentally, as the SAPs became increasingly pervasive in
countries in Africa during the 1980s and early 1990s, the role of local
faith-based
organizations,
international
nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), and humanitarian networks also
became more
prominent, if not critical, in providing social services. 21 9 The waning
role of the government in providing basic social services in the two
decades since the SAPs were implemented created a space for NGOs to
overtake the welfare function that was previously the exclusive domain
of the government. The shifting roles between the state and the non-

214. ROBERT LENSINK, STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN

AFRICA 57

(1996).
215. Id.; see also Tor Krever, The Legal Turn in Late Development Theory: The Rule
of Law and The World Bank's Development Model, 52 HARV. INT'L L.J. 287 (2011)
(describing the World Bank's use of rule of law as an ideological basis for its neoliberal
agenda).
216. See generally Anna Breman & Carolyn Shelton, Structural Adjustment and
Health: A Literature Review of the Debate, Its Role-Players and Presented Empirical
Evidence (WHO Commission on Macroeconomics and Health Working Article Series,
WG6:6, 2001) (discussing the negative impact of structural adjustments on healthcare).
217. Mahmood Monshipouri, Promoting Universal Human Rights: Dilemmas of
IntegratingDeveloping Countries,4 YALE H.R. & DEV. L.J. 25, 41 (2014).
218. See generally Jennifer B. Nuzzo & Gigi Kwik Gronvall, Global Health Security:
Closing the Gaps in Responding to Infectious Disease Emergencies, 4 GLOBAL HEALTH
GOVERNANCE 1 (2011) (discussing the various gaps that are created in global health
security).
219. Hansj6rg Dilger, Doing Better? Religion, the Virtue-Ethics of Development, and
the Fragmentationof Health Politics in Tanzania, 56 AFR. TODAY 89, 94. (2009); Diane
McIntyre et al., Beyond Fragmentationand Towards Universal Coverage: Insights from
Ghana, South Africa and the United Republic of Tanzania. 86 BULL. WORLD HEALTH
ORG. 817, 871-76 (2015).
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state actors proved to be problematic, at least in terms of coordination,
as was evident in the 2014 Ebola crisis.
However, beginning in the 1990s, health began to gain
considerable political traction in the international development
discourse; this discourse resulted in an unprecedented number of
global health initiatives, programs, organizations, and actors in the
global health landscape. Most commonly, these new initiatives tended
to focus on specific interventions or practices-for example, the Global
Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, Global Alliance on
Vaccines and Immunization, and The Vaccine Alliance. This diversity
of global health actors, issues, and activities reflected the growing
political interest in improving health, but the uncoordinated, and often
ad hoc initiatives also produced an incoherent legal order, resulting in
uncertainty about the normative principles that guide global health.
As a legacy of SAPs, nongovernment actors and international aid
organizations-MSF being most prominent-became the primary
providers of health care. As these aid organizations tend to focus on
specific disease prevention, this incidentally overshadowed the need
for horizontal integration of health services at national level. Likewise,
because local and international NGOs tend to focus on vertical
programs, targeting specific diseases and population groups, this
further diminished the need for developing comprehensive public
health systems and surveillance at national and regional levels. While
the involvement of NGOs in the realm of disease prevention is
welcome, local and international NGOs have different functions,
aspirations, capabilities, and emphases, which create a fragmented
healthcare landscape.
The increased influence of the IFI and the multiplicity of new
actors in the realm of global health contribute to what scholars
commonly term "fragmentation" and "duplication." 220 The WHO now
operates in a competitive environment where international and local
actors, at times, compete against each other: recipient states now
partner with international agencies based on what best matches their
preferences.22 1 This phenomenon of fragmentation is not isolated to
the realm of global health. 222 Scholars also observe that the
international climate change governance exhibits a similarly

220. GOSTIN, supra note 21, at 80.
221. Sarah Wood Pallas et. al, Responses to Donor Proliferationin Ghana'sHealth
Sector: A QualitativeCase Study, 92 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 1, 11 (2015).
222. See, e.g., Philippe Roch & Franz Xaver Perrez, InternationalEnvironmental
Governance: The Strive Towards a Comprehensive, Coherent, Effective and Efficient
International Environmental Regime, 16 COLO. J. INT'L. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 16-20
(2005) (discussing fragmentation in the international environmental regime).
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fragmented characteristic. 223 Although, some scholars argue that
fragmentation is not necessarily a bad thing because fragmentation
can catalyze competition and collaboration within the global health
sector and foster organizational learning within international
institutions. 224 But, beyond
the theoretical implications,
fragmentation in global health security governance has resulted in
real, negative consequences: the proliferation of actors and the web of
agencies and programs, for instance, has reduced the efficiency of
health services, and poor coordination among partners and ministries
has led to a funding misalignment between national strategies and
partners' missions. 225 Fragmentation is also costly because it imposes
high transaction costs that consume health ministry resources. In this
regard, the ensuing discussion focuses on the informal institutional
linkage between the WHO and the World Bank as a means of
alleviating institutional fragmentation in the governance of global
health security.
Again, it should be noted that the historical involvement of the IFI
in the realm of global health by no means should be taken as an
indicator of its future role in global health. Yet it is also worth
reiterating that economic development remains a key aspiration and
driver underpinning IFI projects. The World Bank's involvement in
developing fields implies that public health interests are often
secondary, if not subordinate, to economic development. Nonetheless,
the IFI's financial expertise and its enviable position in leveraging
states to comply with its standards suggest that the IFI could play a
valuable and complementary role to that of the WHO in the realm of
global health security. Specifically, the IFI's enviable financial clout
could be used as a leverage to enhance the IHR compliance rate,
producing a synergy between the two historical rivalries and aligning
the IFI's new financial initiatives with the WHO's normative goals in
health. Part IV takes up this discussion below.
IV. THE PANDEMIC

EMERGENCY FACILITY AND THE

LINKAGE WITH THE

IHR

Turning to the proposal of informally linking the IHR and the
PEF, this Part first describes the PEF currently under development
and then demonstrates how the IHR-the existing legal architecture

223. See, e.g., Robert 0. Keohane & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for
Climate Change (The Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements, Discussion
Article 10-33, 2010) (evaluating international law through two optics).
224. Robert Rosenstock & Benjamin K. Grimes, Current Development: The Fiftyfourth Session of the International Law Commission, 97 A.J.I.L. 162, 166-67 (2006).
225. See, e.g., Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., Towards a Framework Convention on
Global Health, 91 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 717, 790 (2013) (stating that ministries
are needed for social benefits in society).
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for global health security--can provide a ready avenue for the proposed
institutional linkage. The discussion herein shows that the linkage
would (at least in theory) strengthen the effectiveness of the IHR in
reference to compliance and enforcement literatures in international
law and international relations. The proposal, in broad strokes,
attempts to expand the current legal regime to one that includes
innovative financing mechanisms, aiming to foster cooperation in the
realm of international infectious disease control. The proposal also
aims to align the World Bank's global financing mechanisms, currently
under development, with the normative goals of the WHO vis-et-vis the
IHR-PEF linkage. Specifically, the proposal focuses on the parametric
trigger of the PEF, which should be determined by the DirectorGeneral of the WHO, in consultation with the World Bank and the
relevant stakeholders.
A. The Pandemic Emergency Facility
Prompted in part by the WHO's leadership failure during the 2014
Ebola outbreak, Dr. Jim Yong Kim, President of the World Bank,
announced that the PEF would finance the response to pandemic
emergencies, covering a range of response activities such as rapid
deployment
of global
health
corps,
medical
equipment,
pharmaceuticals, diagnostic supplies, logistics and food supplies, and
coordination and communication. 226 The PEF would not be extended to
pandemic preparedness or reconstruction, which would be financed
through existing channels, domestic resources, and bilateral
227
development assistance.
The PEF would draw upon the World Bank's financing expertise,
and it would build on existing World Bank financing instruments
designed for providing immediate financing following a natural
disaster. Two market-based mechanisms are under consideration as
the funding source for the PEF: private insurance schemes and
voluntary public funding. 228 The former would rely on the World Bank
purchasing insurance coverage from the private sector to cover risks
associated with the outbreak. In contrast, the latter would rely on longterm donor pledges, which are disbursed when necessary to contain the
outbreak. The fact that, in the past, donor pledges have not been
sustainable strongly suggests that private insurance mechanisms
might be the preferable option.
Beyond developing insurance against pandemic threats, the
World Bank also points out that private sector participation will be
essential in ensuring that pandemic responses are effective and timely.

226. PandemicEmergency Facility:Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 8.
227. Id.
228. Id.
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Potential roles of the private sector include healthcare worker training
and coordinating humanitarian response to crises. The World Bank
points out that the PEF would also create an incentive for countries to
be better prepared for pandemics: states are required to develop a
disaster risk management plan as a prerequisite for eligibility. 229
According to the World Bank, such incentive is particularly welcoming
in light of the fact that the majority of IHR signatories have not
implemented the core capability requirement.
B. The Proposal:Informal IHR-PEFLinkage
Currently, the parametric activation criteria for releasing PEF
funds to support rapid and effective response during the early phase of
an international public health emergency are under discussion. 230 The
parametric trigger is likely to be based on public and observable data,
verified by the World Bank. 231 The proposal, outlined below, argues
that the verification should be made by the WHO Director-General
instead. Specifically, the verification made by the WHO DirectorGeneral would be in keeping with Annex 2 of the IHR, and in
consultation with the relevant states. The informal linkage of IHRPEF could embed the potentially synergistic relationship between the
WHO and the World Bank, building on the normative functions of the
WHO and harnessing the financial expertise of the World Bank.
Crucially, the IHR provides a ready avenue for institutional
collaboration between the World Bank and the WHO. Article 11 of the
IHR, for instance, provides the legal authority for the WHO to share
with relevant intergovernmental organizations the information
provided by State Parties for "verification, assessment and assistance
purposes" before it formally declares a PHEIC. 232 Article 11 creates an
informal channel of communication for the WHO to alert the World
Bank about the emerging health crisis without the need for a PHEIC.
Such flexibility provides a platform for the WHO Director-General to
consult with the World Bank and the relevant stakeholders, including
aid organizations such as MSF, on the emerging health crisis. MSF
pointed out that, had the WHO given greater weight to MSF's
consistent pleas for a strong international response during the early
phase of the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa, the catastrophic loss
of human life could have been averted. 233 The lack of a communicative

229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. IHR(2005), supra note 155, at art. 11.
233. Hayden, supra note 46; MSF, PUSHED TO THE LIMIT AND BEYOND: A YEAR INTO
THE LARGEST EVER EBOLA OUTBREAK, http:Ifwww.msf.orglsites/msf.orglfilesl
msflyearebolareport en 230315.pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2016) [https://perma.cc/
SWD8-6SSC] (archived Sept. 19, 2016).
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platform between the ground organizations and the WHO could be
remedied by the informal channel that would be established through
the IHR-PEF linkage. The linkage would establish an inclusive
participation that extends to non-state actors currently excluded from
the WHO governance model. Broadening participation would also shift
the decision-making process away from the current technocratic, statecentric process that many scholars and practitioners have criticized as
undemocratic. 234 While the WHO Director-General would have the
final say in determining whether the parametric trigger to release the
PEF funds has been met, requiring the Director-General to consult
with the relevant stakeholders before making the call could improve
the quality of decision-making and ensure that the decision made at
the international level better reflects the situation on the ground.
Importantly, allocating the final decision-making to the WHO
Director-General reaffirms the normative role of the agency in the
international infectious disease control regime. The Ebola Interim
Assessment Panel agrees: "[The] WHO should play a central role in the
risk assessments that would trigger such payments so that the
economic impacts of health crises could be mitigated. ' 235 Thus, the
linkage would engender better-informed decisions, in addition to
enhancing the transparency and accountability of both the WHO and
the World Bank.
C. InternationalInfectious Disease Control and Risk Governance
According to the World Bank, the PEF would function principally
as an insurance mechanism because the World Bank would purchase
insurance coverage from the private sector on behalf of developing
countries to cover costs related to disease outbreak response. 236 Funds
would be disbursed to eligible states via the World Bank to finance
critical containment measures. In principle, an insurance system
functions as a mechanism for pooling and transferring the financial
risks of adverse events and builds societal resilience through formal
institutions. The idea of pre-financed sovereign risks in large-scale
disasters through an established insurance mechanism is not new. 237

234. Special Issue: WHO Past, Present and Future,supra note 167, at 195-201.
235.

REPORT OF THE EBOLA INTERIM ASSESSMENT PANEL, supra note 172.

236. Pandemic Emergency Facility:FrequentlyAsked Questions, supranote 8.
237. See generally Jeffrey McGee et al., Writing the FinePrint:DevelopingRegional
Insurance for Climate Change Adaptation in the Pacific, 15 MELBOURNE J. INT'L LAW

444 (2014) (discussing risk pooling facilities for climate change disasters); Alberto Monti,
Climate Change and Weather-Related Disasters: What Role for Insurance, Reinsurance
and FinancialSectors?, 15 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENv. L. & POLY 151 (2009) (discussing
financial management strategies for the large impacts of climate change); DisasterRisk
Financing,OCED, http://www.oecd.org/finance/
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The climate change regime, for instance, pools the financial risks
associated with climate change at a regional level through the
Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility. 238 Similar programs,
such as Mexico's MultiCat, which provides coverage for earthquakes
and hurricanes, and African Risk Capacity, which covers the financial
risks associated with drought, have all achieved documented
239
success.
Currently, two financial mechanisms are under consideration as
a funding source for the PEF: private insurance schemes and voluntary
public funding. As mentioned above, public funding is at significant
risk of donor fatigue. This strongly suggests that the insurance
premium should be funded primarily by a private insurance scheme to
ensure long-term sustainability. States that have violated the IHR
could also be required to contribute to the insurance premium. For
instance, states that have implemented measures additional to the
WHO recommendation, and have failed to disclose the public health
rationales underlying their actions, could be required to contribute to
the insurance premium with a pre-agreed penalty. This mandatory
contribution would function as a deterrent for the penalized behavior
because material consequences would flow from the IHR violation. This
would, at least in theory, function as a signal that would dispel or curb
certain unwanted behavior, discouraging potential violation of the
IHR.
Likewise, encouraging states to adhere to the IHR through
disincentives would mitigate the inherent power asymmetry among
state parties that puts weak states at significant disadvantage, as
weak states often have lack the necessary financial resources to pursue
legal remedy in holding strong states accountable. To that end, weak
states may perceive the regime as unfair, which diminishes their
willingness to participate in that regime. Thus, from a practical
viewpoint, leveling the playing field is also likely to foster a cooperative
international infectious disease regime. More importantly, from a

financial-markets/oecdinternationalnetworkonthefinancialmanagementoflargescalecatastrophes.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2016) [https:Hlperma.cc/99MZ-7ANQ]
(archived Sept. 29, 2016) (discussing insurance for disaster risks).
238. CARIBBEAN CATASTROPHE RISK INSURANCE, http://www.ccrif.org/ (last visited
Sept. 13, 2016) [https://perma.cc/22NZ-YEXL] (archived Sept. 19, 2016).
239. Lucy Nyirend & David Goodman, From Managing Crises To Managing Risks:
The African Risk Capacity (ARC), SWISS RE CENTRE FOR GLOBAL DIALOGUE
(Jan. 18, 2013), http://cgd.swissre.com/features/From-managing-crises to-managing-ri
sks The AfricanRiskCapacityARC.html [https://perma.cc/BS7T-QGPC] (archived
Sept. 19, 2016); AFRICAN RISK CAPACITY, http://www.africanriskcapacity.org/ (last
visited Sept. 15, 2016); Mexico Launches Second CatastropheBond to Provide Coverage
Against Earthquakes and Hurricanes,WORLD BANK, http://treasury.worldbank.orglbd
m/htm/FinancingNoteworthy/MexicoLaunchesSecondCatatropheBondOct2012.ht
ml (last visited Sept. 18, 2016) [https://perma.cc/G6SZ-B2TC] (archived Sept. 19, 2016).
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global justice perspective, leveling the playing field is a morally worthy
goal.
In the case of mandatory contribution as a material consequence
of an Article 43 violation, the economic disincentive would clearly level
the playing field between strong and weak states. Similarly,
introducing mandatory contribution would remove the structural
disincentives that affected states would otherwise have to report a
suspected outbreak within their border. The Ebola Interim Assessment
Panel agrees: "incentives are needed to encourage notification of health
threats. '240 In sum, requiring violating states to contribute to the PEF
insurance premium may move the IHR beyond the moral rhetoric of
the international community, narrow the inherent asymmetric power
structure between strong and weak states, and avoid unfairly
penalizing weak states for disclosing outbreaks within their border.
The above argument is also consistent with political scientist
Alexander Thompson's view on enforcement: he argues that the
enforcement of legal rules must be managed by international
organizations. 241 Thompson's "managing enforcement" model concerns
the way in which violations are approached horizontally across
different institutions. In the ozone regime, for instance, state parties
that failed to develop a "compliance plan" in accordance with the
Montreal Protocol were disqualified from receiving funding from the
Global Environment Facility. In a similar way, the proposed
institutional linkage between the IHR and the PEF is not a farreaching idea. However, instead of punishing states for failing to
implement public health preparedness, as measured against the
benchmarks set by the IHR (currently being discussed), this Article
proposes that the level of premiums should be linked to deliberate,
intentional violations of the JHR, such as Article 43 violations; these
enforceable sanctions would empower the WHO and strengthen the
international infectious disease control regime.
Thus, in principle, violation of the IHR would result in material
legal consequences. However, exceptions should be made when states
are unable to comply with the IHR through no fault of their own. For
instance, failing or failed states' inability to implement core IHR
capability because of poverty or lack of health capacity should be
exempt from sanction. Otherwise, weak states would incur a
disproportionate and unfair burden. Additionally, punishing weak
states for their inherently weak public health infrastructure would
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further diminish their willingness to participate in the regime. It is
worth emphasizing that the ability to implement the core IHR
requirements differs markedly from the willingness to comply with the
IHR. The latter concerns deliberate, intentional violation of the IHR,
which is often driven by the economics of self-interest and at odds with
the cooperative aspirations of the IHR. In contrast, the inability to
comply with the IHR is often driven by multiple complex structural
factors, namely lack of financial resources, instable political structure,
or civil war.
Likewise, linking the IHR with the PEF would engender a thicker
form of cooperation and arguably help structuring states' interests
differently. Legal scholar Joel Trachtman observes that "international
law form[s] a mechanism by which the domestic politics of different
states may be linked, modifying the otherwise applicable political
equilibrium in different states." 24 2 The informal linkage could create a
thicker form of international cooperation by weaving the domestic
politics of different states together. Admittedly, different states often
have different reasons for their noncompliance; however, because the
informal linkage would also increase the frequency and intensity of
repeated interactions among states, it is possible that these repeated
interactions would shape states' domestic interests in turn. This
thicker form of cooperation is also facilitative of perpetuating the
regime, which was created purposely to foster cooperation. Political
scientist Robert Keohane argues that states obey regime rules because
regimes are difficult to create and replace, and it is therefore in states'
long-term interests to avoid noncompliance. 243 In this context, the
proposed economic disincentives would function as a signal that the
IHR is worth defending, and that the regime is worth maintaining.
Alternatively, the mandatory contribution could be perceived as a
small disincentive for defection. Legal scholar Andrew T. Guzman's
rationalist model of compliance suggests that states cooperate when
the importance of a compliance decision is perceived as minor. 244
Professor Guzman explains that international law encourages
cooperation if "its obligations are structured to reduce the importance
of each compliance decision. For example, an arms treaty by itself may
have little success, but a treaty that provides for periodic inspections
by a neutral third party may stand a greater chance of achieving the
goal of arms control. ' 245 Simply put, states comply with a treaty when
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the sovereignty cost is perceived as minimal. By extension, mandating
that violating states contribute to the insurance premium pool also
imposes a minimal sovereignty cost on participating states.
Another way to look at structuring disincentives to increase
compliance is by examining the impact of sanctions. In theory, the
threat of sanctions compels compliance. Legal scholars Oona
Hathaway and Scott Shapiro argue that sanctions need not be a threat
or an exercise of violence; rather, a threat of exclusion can encourage
states to comply with international law. 246 Likewise, legal scholar
Lawrence Gostin maintains that an effective global health regime
should include sanctions such as suspension of eligibility for WHO
Executive Board membership or other WHO rights.247 In this context,
sanctions signal to other states that noncompliance is politically costly
and will result in the suspension of privileges otherwise enjoyed by the
violating state.
Additionally, sanctions can act as leverage against the strategic
holdouts by strong states from international cooperation. Absent the
threat of sanctions, some scholars argue, strong states often lack
incentive to cooperate in the international infectious disease regime,
despite the fact that infectious diseases penetrate national borders
easily. Strong states tend to possess sufficient public health capability
to protect their population from the international spread of infectious
diseases and can elect to enact strong border control measures such as
blanket travel restrictions or compulsory quarantine measures with
little fear of retaliation. The latter is not only disruptive to
international travel and traffic, but also puts weak states at a
considerable disadvantage because they often cannot challenge strong
states' unilateral decisions. In this context, an increased insurance
premium can discourage that unwanted behavior. By extension, for
states, the prospect of contributing to the PEF insurance premium can
be akin to the threat of sanctions, which many scholars argue is
effective in achieving a desirable outcome at the international level. 248
Admittedly, this Article's proposal is bold and faces a number of
challenges. First and foremost, because the proposal would create a
legally enforceable obligation, political resistance from Member States
is likely. Nonetheless, in other legal regimes, states have agreed to
enforceable sanctions even at the expense of sovereignty, one notable
example being the WTO regime. 249 Hence, including some form of

246. Hathaway & Shapiro, supra note 29.
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249. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr.
15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 (explaining disciplines for noncompliance).
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enforceable obligation in the international infectious disease control
regime is not a far-reaching idea. In fact, the Scandinavian states
expressed support for sanctions against states that fail to meet the core
250
requirements of the IHR during the sixty-eighth WHA.
Here, it is useful to conceptually separate three closely related,
but distinguishable terms: "penalty," "sanction," and "financial
disincentive." These terms exist in a spectrum ranging from coercion
to persuasion. For the purposes of this Article, "penalty" is defined as
a punishment for violating an agreed upon rule. In contrast, "sanction"
is an act with the intention to induce compliance through a threat.
Finally, "financial disincentive" is understood as a factor that
discourages a Member State from taking certain action.
Arguably, mandating that violating states contribute to the
insurance premium differs significantly from that of coercing states to
comply with the IHR through sanctions. Mandatory contribution is
neither punitive nor coercive in nature. Instead, mandatory
contribution is a form of financial disincentive that discourages
Member States from taking a disproportionate response during an
international infectious disease outbreak. Moreover, since the PEF is
modeled on the notion of risk management, which means that the legal
consequences of noncompliance with the IHR are not, by definition,
punitive, the conceptual difference would, arguably, lessen political
resistance from states in agreeing to the proposal, as with similar
insurance schemes for natural disasters that have already been
implemented regionally. 251 Additionally, because the IHR was
established chiefly to enhance international cooperation, structuring
economic disincentives to discourage certain behaviors is consistent
with that goal.
Perhaps most importantly, from a practical viewpoint, this issue
is politically ripe. A recent World Bank opinion survey shows that
citizens in France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the
United States are concerned that the world is ill-prepared for another
global epidemic like EVD. 252 Similarly, the large number of
international initiatives aimed at strengthening global health security
suggests that there is a considerable amount of political interest in the
issue. 253 Hence, one key challenge likely to confront the proposal will
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not be the lack of political momentum, but rather how to sustain the
interest of the international community in order to have a meaningful
impact on global health security. Viewed in this light, the informal
institutional linkage between the World Bank and the WHO is likely
to increase the visibility of the issue and keep global health security as
a key item on the international agenda. Admittedly, there are
limitations to the proposal: it does not address the implementation gap
that exist among states; it requires strong WHO leadership, which
many commentators observe is currently absent; and lastly, it will
compete with existing international commitments in a financially
parsimonious world, including the post-2015 developments, 254 and the
replenishment of the Global Fund. 255
Despite the aforementioned limitations, the proposal should be
favored for two key reasons. First, the proposal would compel states to
adhere to the WHO's expert recommendation, which, over time, will
enhance the WHO's reputation and entrench its normative authority
in the international legal order. Relatedly, the linkage would compel
states to give more political weight to a PHEIC and likely galvanize
cooperation. Second, the proposal would shift the international
infectious disease control regime from a principal-agent model to one
that encourages Member States to act as stakeholders. Such a change
is critical from a global health and justice perspective, where the
current regime design tends to embed the inherent power asymmetry
of strong and weak states, which is contrary to the WHO's moral
mission as a voice for the world's most disadvantaged.
Additionally, the informal PEF-IHR linkage would offer at least
three practical advantages. First, because affected states tend to be
leery of the social, economic, and political repercussions that stem from
notifying the WHO about a potential outbreak in their territory, such
flexibility is particularly desirable. Second, the informal linkage would
create an intermediate level between the outbreak and a PHEIC,
which the Ebola Interim Assessment Panel notes as necessary in
alerting and engaging the wider international community at an earlier
phase in the crisis. 256 This is primarily because an intermediate level
could facilitate preparedness and prevention action, which is critical in
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averting an escalation of the situation. Third, the intermediate level
created by the IHR-PEF linkage would better accommodate the reality
of fragile states, where it is a lack of health capability that tends to
underlie their delayed responses rather than an unwillingness to
respond to a health crisis. Thus, the timely release of the PEF funds
would be used to bridge the health capability gap and prevent the
fragile states from stigmatization when they notify the WHO of the
outbreak in their territories.
In sum, the informal linkage would (1) reaffirm the WHO's
normative authority as a global health leader, (2) create incentives for
states to comply with the IHR, (3) create a coherent regime of
international infectious disease control, (4) give the WHO the financial
resources necessary to command international public health
emergency response in the early stages of an outbreak, and (5)
institutionally, be mutually beneficial for both the WHO and the World
Bank because both organizations are struggling to maintain their
relevance in an increasingly crowded global health landscape now
occupied by new players that are arguably better funded.
D. PotentialChallenges to the IHR-PEFLinkage
This Subsection responds briefly to another key potential criticism
of the proposal, which concerns the possible moral hazard that could
be created by the informal IHR-PEF linkage. A moral hazard occurs
when weak states over-rely on the World Bank for financial assistance
and resources once the WHO declares a PHEIC within their territory.
In the long run, this availability of funds could diminish the incentive
for weak states to develop their own public health infrastructure;
encouraging adverse dependency on international financial support
instead. However, from the vantage point of morality and practicality,
such concern is easily countered. First, as mentioned above, in the
instance where failing or failed states do not possess the necessary
public health core capability to respond to a PHEIC, as in the 2014
Ebola outbreak, international organizations owe a moral duty to the
affected state as an equal, moral subject. In particular, as the spread
of infectious disease tends to affect the most vulnerable populations
disproportionately, bioethicists argue that failure to invest in global
health security can be considered a collective moral failing. 257
Importantly, ensuring that the most vulnerable populations have
access to a minimal level of protection in the midst of an infectious
disease outbreak is a manifestation of solidarity. The WHO Ebola
Interim Assessment Panel recognizes the need to embody solidarity in
global health emergency response: "in an increasingly globalized world,
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a disease threat in one country is a threat to us all. Shared
vulnerability means shared responsibility and therefore requires
sharing of resources. 25 8
In addition to the ethical considerations, a sustainable funding
source made readily available to the affected population during a
PHEIC would also encourage participation and engender trust in the
global health security regime. Perceived fairness is important in the
creation of an effective international regulatory regime. Legal scholar
Ilan Benshalom further argues that, insofar as states participate in the
international regime in order to coordinate collective interests, states
"should
pay
for
the
provision
of international
public
' 259
goods ... according to their relative economic abilities.
Likewise,
even from a policy perspective, since the fund would be made readily
available to countries in need of financial assistance, irrespective of
their economic circumstance, it is important to remember that wealthy
countries are not excluded from accessing the fund. Even though the
poor countries are more likely to be in need of the fund, the wealthy
countries are also protected against a potentially costly human
catastrophe. The IHR-PEF linkage would institutionalize processes for
consistent funding decisions and serve as a hedge against economic
uncertainty and emerging infectious diseases for all countries equally.
V. CONCLUSIONS: ADVANCING GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY

This Article proposed informally linking the PEF with the IHR to
ensure consistent and timely global health emergency responses.
While some international law scholars have long advocated for
enforceable obligations that would compel states to follow
international law, global health practitioners have not taken their
suggestions seriously, at least not until the recent 2014 Ebola
outbreak, after which the WHO established a committee to consider
embedding incentives in the existing infectious disease control regime.
But such reactive political action to international infectious disease
must be avoided, most of all at the expense of human life. While a
multitude of reasons explain the slow containment of the 2014 Ebola
outbreak, an IHR with enforceable mechanisms would strengthen
future international infectious disease control responses. This proposal
provides a timely discussion: the world is at a critical juncture, as the
shape of the international infectious disease regime is undergoing
dramatic transformation. The emergence of infectious diseases, such
as the Zika virus, again underscores the urgency of a greater global
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health cooperation. The 2014 Ebola outbreak provided a critical lesson
for global health security, and it highlighted the current gap in the
international infectious disease regime. Drawing on international law
and international relations literature on compliance, this Article
demonstrated how global health security can be enhanced through
realizing the IHR's potential vis-&-vis the financial incentives provided
by the PEP. In doing so, the informal linkage would embed global
health norms and deepen global health cooperation.

